Gendercidal Violence and the Technologies of Othering in Libya and Rwanda

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Abstract

Drawing on Foucault’s concept of governmentality, this article maps gendercidal strategies of othering as these pertain to examples of mass violence in Africa, particularly in Rwanda and Libya. The argument is built around two gendered technologies of power, namely protectionist mythmaking and essentialised agentic inclusions. It is argued that the subtle yet insidious technologies of othering are bolstered by international interventionist and protectionist discourses, as well as a large-scale denial of women's agency in violence. Despite overwhelming evidence of the targeting of males during genocide, cultural stereotypes continue to drive conventional narratives. I conclude that a gender lens that focuses on both men and women’s experiences offers a more inclusive way of resisting the silencing of the other.

Introduction

I use the term ‘gendercidal violence’ not only to refer to the gender-selective mass killing of both men and women, but also to include all types of violence. Broadly conceived then, gendercidal violence suggests a scenario where victims are women and men are men – meaning an apolitical or decontextualised fixation on women and (girl) children as ‘the ultimate victims’. This supports what Mahmood Mamdani calls a search ‘for a clear and uncomplicated moral that describes the victim as untainted and the perpetrator as simply evil’. Although empirical evidence overwhelmingly validates the numerical scope of atrocities against females, it does beg the question whether these accounts are complete and reflective of the ambiguity of the protagonists. It is only when gender is placed at the heart of the analysis that the nuances of agency and victimhood begin to emerge, revealing the complex entanglements of gender and mass violence. This article therefore seeks to contribute to this debate by answering some of the ‘how’ questions related to the gendered
politics of exclusion and/or othering not only under such circumstances, but also broadened to include the post-war scenario.

Critical feminist security studies in particular have contributed to a more nuanced understanding of the multi-layered and complex violations of identity through the practice of othering. Contemporary efforts at peacebuilding are therefore doomed to fail if the subtle yet insidious othering of the postcolonial subject as a gendered (and racialised) being is not challenged. I therefore concur with Adam Jones that scholars and activists working to entrench an anti-genocide regime have much to learn from the successes of feminists in mainstreaming rights-based and violence-focused campaigns. Over the last decade or more a set of liberal norms in the issue area of women, peace and security (WPS) – centred around women's protection and equality with men – has gradually been institutionalised within the UN. Some scholars hail this as a significant step reflecting changing Security Council attitudes regarding WPS specifically. Yet, while it has become commonplace to think about the differential impact of conflict on men and women, as well as the gendered roles that men and women play during and after conflict, the UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948 Genocide Convention) remains contested in its omission of gender (or any other sexual group) as a category worthy of protection. Jurists do warn that an enlarged definition would complicate the initiation of legal proceedings even further. Also, in a general sense one could argue that despite definitional omissions and the failure of international law to comprehensively and consistently protect the vulnerable, a world without such frameworks would probably be too ghastly to contemplate.

That said, the fact remains that omissions, no matter how pragmatic and well-intentioned they may seem, have material effects on the people or groups that are not named. I therefore propose that more attention be given to feminist contributions that speak directly to the violence of othering of men and women, namely an integrated understanding of direct and structural or institutional forms of violence, and an inclusive but critical conceptualisation of victimhood and/or agency. I conceptualise othering in the context of this contribution as a form of alienating or gendercidal violence that draws on interwoven gendered roles, expectations and behaviours during conflict as well as the pervasiveness of gendered cultures of violence in the post-conflict period.

The argument is constructed around two gendered technologies of othering, namely essentialist inclusions (‘thin’ agency) and protectionist mythmaking. In both of these tools the lines between objective (structural and discursive) and subjective (referring to individual bodily harm) violence are blurred. In the first place, I show how inclusions on the basis of assumptions about innate qualities create a semblance of representivity founded on gendered representations of ‘good’ victims and ‘bad’ agents. Stereotypical notions of women’s inclusion in politics and post-conflict reconstruction on the basis of their being mothers and hence more peaceful and less corrupt – as used in Rwandan post-genocide discourse – constitute a skewed politics of recognition (or inverted form of othering) that holds the seeds of latent conflict. Secondly, I examine responsibility to protect (R2P) discourses as well as humanitarian intervention strategies and argue that mythmaking in the name of protection not only fails to address root causes of violence, but also reinforces subaltern women and men’s marginality. An analysis of the recent Libyan case will show how the protection of women was invoked to partially justify external intervention.
In the first section I briefly discuss what othering as a gendered practice entails. I draw on the work of thinkers such as Spivak, Levinas, Beauvoir, Foucault and Card in order to theorise gendered notions of othering, linking genocide and sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV). This is followed by a critical analysis of agency in which I place the spotlight on female agentic violence and the tendency to overlook men's victimhood against the backdrop of the Rwandan genocide of 1994. The next section contextualises an analysis of gendered protectionist discourses in the name of intervention by looking at the violent uprising in Libya during 2011. In both case studies the implications for gender in the post-conflict or post-genocide period are briefly explored. While the outline may appear to follow the traditional ‘structure versus agency’ format, the intention is certainly not to reinforce that binary. As the analysis will show, individual or group agency and institutionalised hegemony are fundamentally intertwined, and so are the strategies of othering. It is therefore not a given that structure undermines agency. A critical gender lens helps to clarify (as well as problematise) these entanglements – suggesting agential possibilities as well as structural limitations.

**The ‘Other Gender’: From Genocide to the Liberal Logics of Peace**

Gayatri Spivak first coined the term ‘othering’ in 1985 by systematically tracing the process through which othering defines the Self. 7 The Self first establishes dominance by making the colonial Other aware of who holds the power; then entrenches the Other’s pathological and moral inferiority; culminating in the denial of access to knowledge and technology – the ultimate statement of difference. 8 The Others are ultimately dehumanised and essentialised, as they are reduced to stereotypical characters embodying ‘just one or a few negative characteristics’. 9 Identity formation of the Other thus rests with the powerful Self, who needs the exploited Other’s inferiority to help sustain the Self’s own sense of superiority.

Emmanuel Levinas also reminds us that this is not always a conscious relationship, when he asks,

> My being-in-the-world or my ‘place in the sun’, my being at home, have these not also been the usurpation of spaces belonging to the other man whom I have already oppressed or starved, or driven out into a third world; are they not acts of repulsing, excluding, exiling, stripping, killing? 10

The notion that our comfortable lives, our very existence, always generate violence, because more often than not, it is made possible by another’s suffering, dovetails with the feminist contention that the private is political, i.e. that there is a connection between everyday gendered insecurity and the skewed gender institutionalisation at the global level. In terms of gender, it was Simone de Beauvoir who first described how men are regarded as the norm and women as the Other, how othering is primordial: ‘Otherness is a fundamental category of human thought. Thus it is that no group ever sets itself up as the One without at once setting up the other over against itself’. 11 Kimberly Hutchings puts Beauvoir’s contribution in context when she explains, ‘[h]istorically... woman … takes its meaning from its relations to man as both less than man (other) and radically different to man (Other). 12 Contemporary feminists have taken their cue from Beauvoir’s distinction...
between ‘female’ (a biological category) and ‘woman’ (an existential category) for the distinction between sex and gender.13 With this as background, ‘doing gender’ (as a verb) means more than just naming identity categories; it is also a verb in order to illuminate the ways in which various security politics and practices rely on logics of gender and how the practices produce and are productive of certain exclusions (otherings).14 I therefore do not only ask the familiar feminist question, posed by Cynthia Enloe, ‘where are the women?’, but also ‘what work is masculinity doing?’ As Zalewski points out, ‘keeping a sharp focus on masculinity can help to dispel the idea that masculinity is all powerful, or that men are the only people important enough to take notice of; …. Moreover, concentrating on masculinity signals quite clearly that the whole of international politics is gendered – a point more easily, if wrongly, missed when the gender focus remains on women’.15

Othering is a multidimensional process that ‘touches upon several different power asymmetries’.16 A gendered understanding of othering draws on the principles of feminist intersectionality theory that offers us a mechanism for studying interlocking systems of oppression related to overlapping identities.17 Although gender remains central to the equation, one has to remember that it operates in tandem with other identities such as race, class, ethnicity, religion, nation and sexual orientation, for instance. Othering is thus a tool for many seasons – for understanding mass violence during war and the fallout of impunity during peacetime.

Some of the many layers of othering during mass violence become evident when a gender lens is employed. It is then that rape as a political strategy of genocide is unmasked as a strategy of othering par excellence. Two criteria determine the genocidal nature of mass violence, namely intent and the nature of the harm caused. The Rwandan case will illustrate how and why the intention to destroy the group through enforced impregnation constitutes genocide. Going beyond the materialities of suffering, rape also takes on genocidal proportions when it involves the notion of ‘social death’. Claudia Card argues in this regard that the ‘[l]oss of social vitality is loss of identity and thereby of meaning for one’s existence. Seeing social death at the center of genocide takes our focus off body counts … directing us instead to mourn losses of relationships that create community’.18 The loss of cultural or social identity through stigma thus produces a society of the Living Dead, with no sense of belonging.

Othering through liberal peacebuilding practices introduced to ‘save the natives from themselves’ is similarly motivated by the construction of geographical and social distance through processes of differentiation and demarcation.19 The assumption of the Western Self is that its obligation to produce peace ‘is derived from the allegedly precedent unwillingness or inability of the non-Western other to maintain peace’,20 or as Evans asserts, ‘for liberalism “Others” are the problem to be solved’.21

In this regard Foucault writes that liberalism ‘is not so much the imperative of freedom as the management and organization of the conditions in which one can be free’.22 For this freedom to work, the principle of an economy of inclusion and exclusion needs to be accepted. Othering therefore not only naturalises and universalises liberal order, but also reifies difference to reinforce the fact that ‘only a specific form of life is considered worthy’ — a life of freedom and liberty socially constructed and reinforced through a very specific set of social practices.23 In this respect Foucault’s concept of ‘governmentality’ (the art of government) is useful, as it exposes the rationalities that inform the liberal macro-discourses and micro-practices of peace and security governance in the
name of conformity. The concept helps us to uncover specific gendered techniques and technologies of power. For example, the National Action Plans adopted to guide the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 on Women, Peace and Security (2000) in several African countries establish a wide range of indicators for monitoring implementation and accountability. These plans are presented as monitoring from a distance while giving the impression of a free and fair partnership based on local ownership.

**Othering through Gender-Selective Agency: The Case of Rwanda**

In this section I highlight the complex and multiple layers of gendered othering during and after conflict. I contend that agency comes in many forms, thick and thin, but always at a price.

‘Agency’ refers to the capacity of human beings to exercise independent choice as either individuals, collectives or proxies – and the ability to act on it. However, its conceptualisation is complicated by the fact that agency is always socially situated. This means that the interplay between agency and situatedness will invariably have implications for the inclusion of some and the exclusion of others. As Badiou remarks, '[l]iberal multicultural tolerance only celebrates the “other” if he is a good other – which is to say what, exactly, if not “the same as us”?' This entanglement of othering and agency could thus have unintended consequences. The agency of women during war (in the form of newfound responsibility and economic independence) often dissipates after the conflict has ended to make space for men who want to reclaim their space. This occurs in subtle but often harmful ways. For instance, in processes of post-conflict reconstruction, women’s agency is narrowly circumscribed by clinging to essentialist views on women’s role in society. Women would be ‘allowed’ to enter politics on the basis that as mothers they are naturally more peaceful and less corrupt. Women, due to their innate qualities, are also considered to be better equipped to deal with SGBV. Furthermore, despite having to carry the burden of post-conflict reconstruction because most men are either dead or still in hiding, women in security sector reform (SSR) usually end up in inferior positions, as the case of female police officers acting as cooks for male officers in Sierra Leone illustrates. The international community and local/national authorities acknowledge women’s agency as security providers for the sake of operational efficiency. However, as soon as women begin to question policies, they are labelled as troublemakers (‘bad’ agents), and targeted to be silenced through co-optation. While one could argue that such access to security institutions opens space for enhanced agency, the hype about the critical mass that women currently enjoy in the Rwandan parliament tends to obscure the deficits in terms of ‘thick’ agency.

Feminist scholars have played an important role in exposing the subtle and not so subtle homogenising descriptions of women’s agency roles during mass violence and beyond. They have challenged international gender discourses such as UNSCR 1325 for insufficiently conceptualising the range of spaces (and women’s various conflicting roles within those contexts) in which peace has to be negotiated. It is argued that this results in the depiction of unproblematised gender roles and uncritical, utopian assumptions that a female presence will result in positive change. Since agency is a relational concept, and liberal discourses work with a binary of femininity versus masculinity, it follows that if women are cast as victims, the immediate effect is that the positive
masculinity (protector) and negative masculinity (perpetrator) of men are reinforced. In this regard Jean-Bethke Elshtain, in her classic work *Women and War*, juxtaposes the ‘beautiful soul’ of femininity and the ‘just warrior’ image of men and masculinity. Laura Sjoberg and Caron Gentry’s book *Mothers, Monsters, Whores* offers an insightful study of women’s violence in global politics, ranging from military women who engage in torture to the Chechen ‘Black Widows’, Middle Eastern suicide bombers, and the women who directed and participated in genocides in Bosnia and Rwanda. The authors explain that the stereotypes used to depict women all assume that women have no agency, with agency being equated with inappropriate female behaviour.

Nowadays the gender-selective targeting of women through rape enjoys much attention. Feminists have sought to explain SGBV and other forms of violent male behaviour by emphasising gendered constructions of masculinity, particularly the lethal combination of hypermasculinity and militarism. Predominantly asking, ‘where are the women?’, has, however, led to an exclusive focus on male violence against females, overlooking males’ gendered experience and thus producing a skewed picture. Scholars of masculinities have therefore built on feminist work to include men within the framework.

The overwhelming historical evidence of the gendercidal targeting of males necessitates a more inclusive approach to the subject of othering. The historical trend has been first the wholesale massacre of males in a community, followed by the kidnapping and enslavement of the women and children. This explains the huge female refugee and cleansed populations, and also means in practice that the burden invariably falls on women in the post-conflict reconstruction period, with the men being either in hiding or dislocated in remote areas. This trend was evident not only in the days of Homer and Thucydides, but also from the practices employed by Ottoman Turks against Armenians (1914-1923), the Nazis against the Jews, the Belgian Congo against Africans (1890-1910), Stalin in the 1930s, and Hutu extremists against the Tutsi and moderate Hutus in Rwanda. Men constituted the overwhelming majority of those killed.

The explanations for the Rwandan genocide are, however, fraught with ahistorical and one-sided narratives that depict the genocide as a loose-standing event – a flare-up in 1994 between Hutu perpetrators and Tutsi victims, conveniently forgetting the long-standing tensions between these two communities going back to Belgian colonialism. One such explanation traces the origins of the genocide back to a ‘gender crisis’ for young Hutu men, who as a result of IMF-imposed structural adjustment programmes were one of the groups suffering from a subsistence crisis, with no prospect to obtain land or employment, thus being unable to marry and achieve the necessary social status. In this context, killing Tutsis offered a significant opportunity for upward mobility. As a necessary corrective, Beatrice Umutesi’s book, *Surviving the Slaughter*, describes the ‘invisible genocide’ or backlash against Hutu refugees in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) after the victory of the Tutsi-led Rwandan Patriotic Front.

A more objective reading of Rwandan history thus reminds us that instead of inadvertently reproducing old binaries of victim and perpetrator, one should view the ‘Other’ as a fluid identity category. In the aftermath of the 1994 genocide, Rwanda’s peacebuilding process has been hailed as gender-responsive and inclusive of women, even if the peace negotiations that set up the transitional government excluded women. Yet, a critical look at othering through a gender lens further exposes several gendered assumptions related to mobilisation strategies for mass violence;
women’s exclusive victimhood during the genocide; as well as the nature of their involvement in the reconstruction period.

In the first place, gender-selective propaganda usually employs the tactic of demonisation to depict women, the gendered other, as dirty, sexually promiscuous and dangerous. With women the lens is usually narrowly focused on their sexual and reproductive capacities; leading up to the genocide, the gendered propaganda is usually more targeted at men. In Rwanda, Hutu propaganda depicted Tutsi women as a sexually seductive ‘fifth column’ in cahoots with Hutu enemies and external forces. This kind of propaganda feeds on gendered desires and vulnerabilities and has the effect of mobilising male and female perpetrators alike. During the genocide, government propaganda portrayed Tutsi women in the Hutu Ten Commandments as beautiful and desirable, but ‘too good’ for Hutu men. This created a climate in which the mass rape of Tutsi women as a form of subjugation was ‘normalised’. Valeria Bemeriki, a female radio announcer, became a role model for many Hutu women and was instrumental in painting Tutsi women as a threat. Ultimately, Hutu nationalism weighed heavier than a sense of sisterhood with Tutsi women.

Secondly, and contrary to what some cultural codes and humanitarian biases would have us believe, many Hutu women played an active role at every level of the genocidal enterprise, from planning and administering killing to supervising mass executions, stripping the dead of their valuables, and exposing those in hiding. This notwithstanding, we should remember that the number of male perpetrators in Rwanda still outstripped the number of women; so we should be careful to not overstate the case. However, Pauline Nyiramasuhuko, former minister of Family and Women’s Affairs, is alleged to have ordered (as a mother) her son to commit rape and murder. She ordered and supervised abductions, detentions, murder, rape and torture by the *Interahamwe* (the civilian death squads). She is the first woman ever to be charged with rape as a crime against humanity. Bizarrely, the gendered assumption that women and mothers cannot kill tends to override the facts of trial statistics, especially when it comes to female, mainly high-profile perpetrators. Consequently, mainstream narratives of the genocide (especially within Rwanda) continue to depict these cases as exceptions and these female perpetrators as genderless and inhumane deviants or freaks. In the process, as Brown remarks, ‘violent female agency during the Rwandan genocide served to simultaneously contradict and uphold patriarchal norms’. Adam Jones also confirms this trend in international discourse on gender and human rights, when he states that women’s disproportionate victimisation is taken ‘almost as an article of faith’.

While it is easy to think of women and children as vulnerable, it is not so natural in the case of men. Despite clear evidence of a gendercidal targeting of males, there have been attempts to rewrite history in order to depict women as the principal targets. Men (in particular elites) comprised more of the casualties than women, especially during the early stages, but it was nevertheless assumed that because women were raped, they had to be the main victims, as concluded by the UN Special Rapporteur on Rwanda, René Degni-Ségui, in 1996. Once the stereotype of the Other is accepted as the norm, we run the risk of signing off on discriminatory policies that are in fact deeply harmful. In this regard, Jones cites the gender-selective evacuation policies of the UN on the insistence of the Serb occupying forces at the expense of vulnerable Bosnian men in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Lastly, women have been included in the post-conflict reconstruction process in record numbers, but often this inclusion has emphasised the purity and peacefulness of feminine women as something that the Rwandan society desperately needs to call upon. In recognising the disproportionately strong impact the war had on women, the Rwandan government openly stated that they considered women’s participation in peacebuilding and governance to be crucial for long-term democratisation and sustainable peace. The constitution enshrines a commitment to gender equality and reserves at least 30 per cent of posts in decision-making positions for women. After the parliamentary elections of 16 to 18 September 2013, Rwandan women now hold 64 per cent of parliamentary seats. But despite the inclusion of women in governance, their representation remains marginal at senatorial, ministerial and ambassadorial levels, as well as at lower levels of governance in the districts. Many culturally inscribed stereotypical understandings about women and femininity also remain in place. In the post-genocide period, women have drawn upon their traditional roles as mothers, wives, daughters, or community conciliators, and the moral authority that comes with these roles to call for an end to the conflict. These roles are not only reinforced by stereotypical perceptions that women are better at reconciliation, but also by experiences at the community level that women are less corrupt than men. It could become counterproductive if these informal (and essentialised) roles are the only roles women are allowed to play, or if these conciliatory roles become viewed as the exclusive responsibility of women. Some of the Hutu female killers capitalised on the popular peaceful stereotypes of women and were granted refugee status in several African and European countries by officials who assumed them to be victims of the genocide. The lack of acknowledgement of women’s violent agency in the orthodox narrative also means that female perpetrators have not been included in the national discourse of reconciliation and reconstruction. A combination of denial of complicity, anger in shifting the blame upon victim groups and the government, and being well positioned as mothers to transmit these ideologies of othering to their children do not bode well for long-term stability.

In the post-genocide period, the Rwandan government has walked a tightrope between the ‘multi-party democracy favoured by donors and a more tightly managed political environment that it argues is necessary for security’. There are many positive aspects, such as record economic growth, improved education and a zero-tolerance policy towards corruption. However, growth does not necessarily translate into a redistribution of wealth; Anglophone Tutsi occupy an advantageous position in Rwanda at the expense of other groups, and there is a growing climate of authoritarianism. In the name of nation building, discourse about ethnic difference has become taboo, so much so that it is making it more difficult to identify cases of discrimination. Wielenga (in this issue) correctly argues that ethnicity as an identity framework tends to obscure other identity constructions within post-genocide Rwanda. I would add, however, that the overemphasis on national unity as a bulwark against ethnic division may be detrimental to the feminist cause where class and ethnic differences among women and relations to men in the national gender discourse are not interrogated.

The case study reveals that structural causes underpin these agentic dilemmas, which brings me to the second technology of othering.
Gendercidal Violence in Libya and Rwanda  
Heidi Hudson

Othering through ‘Gendercidal’ Institutions and the Gender-Selective Technologies of Protection: The Case of Libya

The concept ‘structural violence’ is a useful yardstick to determine the extent of socio-economic justice and well-being, and is defined as existing when economic and social conditions are such that people die or suffer as a result of the unequal distribution of resources. Nutritional and educational deficits, maternal mortality and honour killings are forms of gendered human insecurity that are seated in unequal and gendered structures or institutions. For example, maternal mortality has a death toll of some 600 000 women annually; it is not just once-off like the Rwandan genocide. But in many countries, no money is spent on reducing this. This condition of neglect or abandonment is often a worse form of violence than tangible mass cleansings. At the same time, it is worth recognising that practices such as military conscription, capital punishment and forced labour all targeted men, at times almost exclusively.

At times human insecurity can take on such proportions that it can be termed genocide, requiring humanitarian intervention based on the principle of Responsibility to Protect (R2P). The case of international responses to sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) testifies to this. Examples of gender-targeted sexual violence and mass killings abound, such as rape by Japanese forces (1937–1938), mass rapes in the Bangladesh war of 1971, rape by Soviet soldiers on German territory (1945), mass rapes in Bosnia (1992–1995), and the raping of Tutsi women in Rwanda in 1994. More recently, examples from Sierra Leone and the DRC come to mind. SGBV has had a disproportionate impact on women. Estimates place the number of rapes during the Rwandan genocide between two hundred and fifty thousand and five hundred thousand. Rape does not only inflict humiliation and terror on individual women, but also aims to degrade the women’s ethnic groups, their men, and their community as a whole, as captured by the idea of social death. In addition to these gross bodily violations, women suffer loss of livelihood, displacement, separation from family, food insecurity, psychological trauma, and loss of traditional social networks. In Rwanda, the HIV prevalence rate dramatically increased from one per cent before the conflict in 1994 to 11 per cent in 1997.

Gradually, through a process of norm diffusion, the international discourse evolved to the point where rape is now recognised as a weapon of war and a crime against humanity. This includes criminalising all forms of sexual violence and trafficking with the aim of sexual enslavement. So even if rape does not lead to death, it aims to undermine the security and cultural cohesion of the targeted community (of men and women) and is therefore considered a form of genocide. The Rwanda tribunal’s definition of rape as ‘a physical invasion of a sexual nature committed on a person under circumstances which are coercive’ and the explicit naming of gender crimes as crimes against humanity and war crimes in the statute of the International Criminal Court played a key role in this process of norm diffusion. UNSCR 1820 notes that rape and sexual violence are war crimes, and perpetrators should be prosecuted. It further recognises sexual violence as a detriment to international peace and security and calls for the specific training of UN troops on the zero-tolerance policy toward sexual violence. It means that the international community must now be seen to act decisively, such as when the UN published a report that found about 200 women and
girls had been raped in November and December 2012 in South Kivu (DRC), mainly by members of the Congolese army who claimed that they were ordered to commit these atrocities.69

However, international discourse has failed in many respects. While the understanding of SGBV during conflict and post-conflict has evolved, UN discourses have remained stuck in the awareness stage. UN rape discourses unwittingly perpetuate the protector-protected power relationship, as UN advocacy has narrowly focused on exposing the crime, urging governments to condemn sexual violence, and demanding and offering justice for victims. Consequently, the failure to acknowledge the incidence of SGBV (breaking the silence) is treated as the main cause for its prevalence.70 Awareness raising has therefore become a goal in itself. In this problem-solving framework, there is little room for considering the contextual dimensions and structural (e.g. political economy) dilemmas causing or perpetuating SGBV post-conflict.71 By concentrating on rape as a crime about sex, the broader patriarchal social order and its unequal gender power relations are not considered.72 Presenting rape as a narrowly defined ‘poor African female problem’ not only invokes colonial stereotypes and a colonial gaze, but also confines policy to the ‘women question’.73 The narrow focus of UNSCR 1820 may reinforce women’s victimhood and largely exclude SGBV against men and boys.74

Ramesh Thakur maintains that the R2P has particular relevance for Africa and that it is guided not by indifference, but by alarm and shame at the increasing number of atrocities in which the international community stood by as passive onlookers, unable to overcome constitutional constraints and normative inadequacies.75 For Slavoj Žižek, this is rather hypocritical:

[I]n combating subjective violence, we in fact, by the same gesture, commit ‘objective violence’ that generates the very phenomenon that we attempt to eradicate. When we condemn obvious instances of subjective violence – killings and rapes perpetrated by soldiers against women and children, for example – we choose a hypocritical sentiment of moral outrage while remaining comfortably blind to the actual causes of this violence, its systemic aspects. We are enabling the political and economic system of advanced capitalism to operate smoothly by loudly protesting against its catastrophic consequences.76

The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) identifies two broad sets of circumstances that could justify military intervention, namely (1) large-scale ethnic cleansing, real or apprehended, executed through killing, forced expulsion and acts of terror or rape and (2) ‘large-scale loss of life, actual or apprehended, [inflicted] with genocidal intent or not, which is the product either of deliberate state action, or state neglect or inability to act, or a failed state situation’.77 With reference to the latter condition, the cases of Zimbabwe, Libya and Syria come to mind. It is therefore clear that the UN’s protection regime not only displays many gaps of capacity and political will, but also, more importantly, has to contend with institutional gender deficits that are exacerbated by the two interrelated technologies of othering which form the subject of analysis in this article. The first strategy is to make only women count as being worthy of protection. In this regard, as discussed in the previous section, scholars have offered extensive empirical evidence of a one-sided framing of gender and humanitarian intervention, overlooking the needs of men in similar conditions.78 Gender-selective protection practices make a mockery of the international commitment to a broad humanitarian imperative. Moreover, it narrows the political focus and fixes
the perpetrator-victim continuum to only mean one thing – men as the perpetrators and/or protectors and women as the victims to be protected. In the second place, by extension, othering occurs when the discourses of international organisations, governments and/or opponents manipulate sexual threats to women’s security to achieve political ends, as demonstrated in Libya recently.

Feminist critiques of the war in Afghanistan have highlighted how the struggle for the emancipation of women has been used as part of the justification of R2P. The events of 2011 in Libya illustrate similar attempts at othering. While I am not claiming that Western intervention in Libya was justified in gender terms or that gender was invoked as a reason for regime change, we cannot ignore the fact that a gender/rape narrative was one of the strategies used by Gaddafi to instil fear and used by his opponents to demonise him. Western allies and international organisations inadvertently bought into these local discourses. However, with such indirect justification of R2P also come unintentional othering consequences – propping up patriarchy and perpetuating women’s inability to speak for themselves.

In early 2011, violent demonstrations gained momentum in response to the Gaddafi regime’s brutal crackdown. An armed opposition group, the National Transition Council (NTC), started gaining a firm hold over key cities, but the moment that tipped the scale was when Gaddafi declared that ‘officers have been deployed in all tribes and regions so that they can purify all decisions from these cockroaches’. With this being framed as an unprecedented case of clear intent to commit mass atrocities, UN officials (e.g. the Special Advisers and the UN’s High Commissioner for Human Rights and Secretary General) started building up the matter as an issue of human protection, warning that this act would constitute crimes against humanity. Calls for tough international action from France and the United Kingdom, together with the Gulf Cooperation Council urging the UN Security Council to take steps to protect civilians, amongst others, were largely instrumental in the passing of UNSCR 1970 (26 February 2011) and UNSCR 1973 (17 March 2011) to authorise the use of force.

The discourse of the United States, the United Kingdom and France rested on a familiar ‘us versus them’ dichotomy, with Gaddafi and a few loyalists pictured as the root of all evil, and the rebels as the antithesis. Earlier studies which highlighted how Gaddafi’s pragmatism (the strategising of a rational man) facilitated his reacceptance into the international fold were ignored. Instead, according to the liberal peace thesis, the ‘aggressor’ is always irrational, and the ‘protector’ always rational. The blind acceptance of the unsubstantiated claim that Gaddafi was about to commit genocide went against common sense and presented us with an oversimplified and decontextualised explanation.

Both external and internal discourses had the same result – obscuring the real issues and providing the scaffolding for intervention. Early in the rebellion it was rumoured that African mercenaries were being used against the opposition. However, Amnesty International could not find any evidence supporting this allegation. The rebels capitalised on existing racialised and xenophobic discourses, the consequence of which was mass arrests of black men by rebels later.

The initial foundation for introducing the use of rape as tool of war in Libya rested on three rather thin and contentious claims. Firstly, the catalyst was when Iman al-Obeidi told foreign journalists that she had been gang-raped by Gaddafi’s soldiers. Secondly, a Libyan psychologist, Seham Sergewa, claimed to have sent out 70 000 questionnaires in which 259 reports of rape were
Gendercidual Violence in Libya and Rwanda | Heidi Hudson

found – this, despite a non-functional postal system. The final sensationalist claim was when the Prosecutor of the ICC, Luis Moreno-Ocampo, announced that Libyan government soldiers had been issued Viagra to increase their potential to perform mass rapes.

Much of the framing of the crisis in gender language drew on the general assumption that rape is an early warning sign of a societal order disintegrating. Asma Khader, Secretary General of the Jordanian National Commission for Women, declared (in her capacity as one of a three-member UN commission) that thousands of women had been raped. Moreno-Ocampo, in a report to the UN Security Council, also stated that ‘while it is premature to draw conclusions on specific numbers, the information and evidence indicates at this stage that hundreds of rapes occurred during the conflict’. UN Special Envoy for Libya, Abdul Elah al-Khatib, highlighted that the grave humanitarian conditions included ‘significant’ protection concerns over, amongst others, gender-based violence. On 8 June 2011, the International Criminal Court (ICC) announced that the Gaddafi regime would be investigated for the use of mass rapes during the conflict, emphasising rumours about Viagra. Reports revealed that men were also victims of rape and sexual torture, but it was the insecurity of women and the need to protect them by military means that occupied the headlines and international discourse. According to Omar of the US Institute of Peace, Gaddafi’s apparent aim was to outrage the opposition to the extent that ‘the fighters abandon their posts and return to protect the women, many of whom are vulnerable living with their children in large encampments’. US Ambassador to the UN, Susan Rice, added her voice to the growing rape discourse, by reportedly telling the Security Council that evidence (referring to the Viagra allegations) did indeed exist of widespread raping of women within the opposition by Libyan forces. Gaddafi’s elite and rather exotic female bodyguard, the so-called Amazonian Guard, also joined the chorus by claiming that some of them had been raped by members of the upper echelons of his government, implicating Gaddafi and his sons. In one swoop, Gaddafi’s female protectors, for years held up as counter-symbols, were returned to their original victim status.

Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, however, have questioned whether rape was in fact used as a weapon of war. There is a strong possibility that the Viagra rumours were opposition propaganda aimed at drumming up Western support for the rebels. While one cannot deny evidence of rape (and since many rapes go unreported, the numbers could even be higher), the key bone of contention is whether there was evidence of systematic rape. That said, both sides used rape (and/or the threat thereof) as a weapon – Gaddafi to instil fear and enforce compliance, rebel forces as a means of retaliation. The threats fed on deep-seated cultural practices such as retributive gendercide to defend the honour of the family. Western protectionist responses played neatly into these constructions and practices. I thus concur with Burns, who argues that ‘[t]he increased visibility of sexual crimes in war zones is too often twisted to supply a gendered logic to arguments for military solutions, however, playing into the worst of Western protectionist fantasies and frequently increasing the harm to women and men who have been victimized’.

These actions often overlook the historical and socio-political complexities of the gendered landscape – something that is not easily captured by statistics and which is also made more complicated by the difficulty to obtain reliable African development statistics as well as the possibility of manipulation. For instance, gender advocates have made dubious statistical claims in order to justify attention to women. Claims of high numbers of rapes in Libya should therefore be
Gendercidal Violence in Libya and Rwanda
Heidi Hudson

read in conjunction with possibly equally questionable statistics that indicate that gender equality was – compared to other countries in the region – not dire. In fact, the United Nations Development Programme certified that Libya had made significant progress, especially in the areas of education and health. The Human Development Report of 2010 ranked Libya 52, which is ahead of Egypt (ranked 108), Algeria (70), Tunisia (56), Saudi Arabia (128) and Qatar (94). Although 2012 saw the election of 33 women (out of 200 seats), many barriers remain in a society divided along tribal lines. In the aftermath of the 2011 crisis, Islamic law is beginning to play a more prominent role in informing legal frameworks than before, and this poses many challenges for women’s equality. The penal code still considers sexual violence to be a crime against a woman’s ‘honour’, i.e. the family, rather than her as an individual. While under Gaddafi’s state feminism, women were pushed into the public domain and their educational levels were high, most matters related to the family’s honour continued to be settled in private. It thus remains to be seen whether the increased voice of female activists will be able to challenge the strong vested interests around the status quo. One thing is certain: issues of women’s rights will remain controversial and contradictory, at once being side-lined and prioritised to be exploited for political gain.

Conclusion

The article highlighted some of the direct and indirect technologies of othering, in which both ‘colonials’ and ‘natives’ are complicit through contrived and qualified inclusions. I identified the recognition of SGBV as genocide; a critique of thin versions of agency based on gendered stereotypes; the exposure of gender-selective targeting in genocide and gender-selective protectionist practices; and an integrated analysis of direct and gendercidal or institutional violence as key themes spearheaded by activists and scholars in their attempts to make feminist sense of the complex connection between gender and mass violence.

In an age of governmentality, the dominant discourse is one of consensus, to become more like the Self. If not, the Other has only two options – to be typecast as Victim or Villain. The two case studies were therefore chosen because they are perceived to be operating on opposite sides of the continuum of political evil, as well as representing divergent forms of othering. Seen through the eyes of a guilt-ridden West who watched but did nothing to stop the carnage, post-genocide Rwanda is widely considered the poster child of women’s advancement. In contrast, protection of the Libyan people through intervention was justified partly because Gaddafi’s status as villain took on a gendered dimension. And since political rape narratives hinge on underlying assumptions and fears about societal disintegration (and social death), the construction of protectionist rhetoric proved to be successful in supporting a broader discourse of intervention. A closer examination of the two cases also reveals the contrived nature of the narratives. Dominant local and international discourses romanticise the agency of women and vilify the victimhood of men in Rwanda. Similarly, in Libya dominant narratives about women’s vulnerability mystified rather than clarified subjectivities. Yet, whether pariah or poster child, both remain fixed in their positions as an ‘Other’, in much the same way that Sabine Hirschauer elsewhere in this Special Issue shows...
how the continuous gendered ‘othering’ of women across apartheid and post-apartheid periods has contributed to a very specific kind of political rape narrative.101

Based on the evidence presented in the two case studies, I therefore conclude that an inclusive gender lens, applied systematically, broadens the analytical gaze to highlight gender-selective targeting practices. This kind of theorising not only produces a more nuanced understanding of the roles of men and women involved in mass violence, but also exposes the gendercidal effects of international intervention. As a form of resistance, a gender lens challenges essentialised and narrow views of agency and victimhood.

But how do we move beyond the binary of Self and Other? How do we transcend the agent-victim dichotomy? Claudia Aradau and Rens van Munster distinguish between two approaches to resistance, namely the ethical and the agency approaches. The ethical approach concentrates on how the subject of security can and should develop a perspective of the Self that recognises the mutuality of the Self and the Other. The agency approach criticises the fact that the Other, the abject of security, is always derived from a Western notion of ‘us’ and is stripped of any agency. The former, although noble in intention, is essentially still one-directional and all about the Western Self becoming a better Self. Although the latter approach theoretically provides an alternative to victimisation, it still cannot escape the self-other dichotomy. The problem with abject agency is that it is always reactive to a particular pre-existing logic and practice of security; resistance is assumed to always come after injustice.102

In my view, the answer to these questions does not lie in an opposite or in a ‘beyond’, but within the binary order itself. One needs to look towards feminist postcolonial approaches that draw on a deep understanding of hybridity and a rhizome-like intersectionality. Our attention should be focused on a process of becoming, i.e. what happens to gender and all the other overlapping identities at the point where they intersect? Will global security and mass violence look different if we begin to acknowledge the terrains of mutuality rather than difference? What if we recognise the fundamental contradictory nature of these entanglements whilst at the same time being attentive to history and a memory of injustice? It is at this junction that the seeds of a more sustainable mutuality could be sown.

As discussed, both Rwanda and Libya are at a crossroads, where both victim and perpetrator, in the process of becoming ‘One(self)’, need to ‘do’ gender rather than ‘be’ half a gender.

Notes and References


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52 Porter, E., 2007, p.177.
56 Brown, S.E., 2013, pp.15–16.
Gendercidal Violence in Libya and Rwanda | Heidi Hudson


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Gendercidal Violence in Libya and Rwanda | Heidi Hudson


