Bullet ridden building in Huambo, Angola. Photo: Mark Naftalin, pRIo
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Civil conflict remains by far the most common form of armed conflict. At the end of 2009, the last year for which we have reliable data, 36 armed conflicts (involving at least 25 battle-related casualties) were being fought in 27 different countries. Six of these conflicts exceeded 1,000 battle deaths, a threshold that is often used to distinguish a war from other forms of armed conflict. Seven of the 36 armed conflicts in 2009 had not been active in 2008: an entirely new conflict broke out in Burma/Myanmar (Kokang); conflicts were restarted by new actors in the Central African Republic, India (Bodoland), Nigeria and Yemen; and previously dormant conflicts re-erupted in Angola (Cabinda) and Rwanda. (For a more comprehensive update on conflict in the world, see the 2009 annual data feature ‘Armed Conflicts, 1946–2008’, by Lotta Harbom & Peter Wallensteen, in Journal of Peace Research 46(4): 577–587.)
Mind the Gap!

The consequences of violent conflict are profound and far reaching. Modern technologies of war give armies the capacity to kill large numbers of people efficiently and brutally. However, the consequences of war extend far beyond direct battlefield casualties. Although media attention usually ends as soon as a ceasefire has been signed, this is often when the most dramatic consequences of armed conflict kick in.


In September 2000, world leaders met at the United Nations headquarters in New York for the Millennium Development Summit. Out of that meeting came the UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), which were adopted by every UN member-state. The MDGs quickly became the benchmark for measuring progress in development. The goals were to eradicate extreme poverty, to achieve universal primary education, to promote gender equality, to reduce child mortality, to improve maternal health, to combat HIV/AIDS and to ensure environmental sustainability. While a number of research teams have studied the economic effects of conflict in recent decades, the recent study by CSCW researchers Gates, Hegre, Nygård and Strand is the first to systematically study the consequences of conflict across the full spectrum of the UN MDGs.

Not surprisingly, the study finds that conflict has detrimental effects across all of these goals, and in sum the burden is extensive. More than a billion people live in conflict-affected countries. Of these, an estimated 260 million live in absolute poverty, while 210 million are undernourished and almost 400 million are without access to adequate sanitation facilities. Conflict on average increases infant mortality rates by a little over 1%. In real terms that means that, in an average-size developing country, five years of conflict increases infant mortality from 75 to 84 deaths per 1,000 live births – which translates into 9,000 excess infant deaths a year. Similarly, a five-year conflict decreases the proportion of the country that attains secondary education by 7.5 percentage points. This translates into a tremendous loss for both individuals and the society as a whole – a loss that will linger for a long time after a conflict ends.

Inevitably, conflict affects some groups harder than others, and in the case of civil conflict we find that children are the hardest hit. Again, this is not breaking news, but the mechanisms through which conflict degrades the lives of young people are not as straightforward as one might assume, and these mechanisms should point to policies that can alleviate some of the burden. Conflict increases infant mortality rates. However, this is not due to deteriorating maternal health but through the effect of conflict on potable water. Access to potable water is essential for every human being, but infants and young children are the hardest and most immediately affected by water-borne diseases. Wars cut off people’s access to sources of potable water, as well as hampering the maintenance and development of these sources. Lack of access to clean water massively increases the risk of the spread of diarrheal illnesses, and the consequences of this are seen in dramatic increases in mortality among infants and children under the age of five. Additionally, conflict affects primary-school rates much harder than secondary-school rates, which again indicates that young children are left to bear the brunt of war.

In the past decade, the economic consequences of war have been the subject of a great deal of analysis. A central finding in the relevant literature is that war, particularly civil war, is a development issue. Conflict is at the same time both a consequence of lacking development and a cause of it. Such a dynamic has the potential to lock countries in a conflict trap.

The 2009 Human Security Report argued that the forces of development are now so strong that even countries in conflict can see a continuing improvement in terms of the MDGs. This may be true, but it is far from the whole story. Countries that experience conflict typically start out with lower scores on the MDG indicators, and conflict further slows the pace of improvement. The gap between countries in conflict and those that do not experience conflict is substantial, and it represents perhaps the biggest burden imposed by war. By slowing down progress on core development issues such as infant mortality, education and gender equality, conflict creates an excess of death and lost human potential that is staggering. This gap is the real untold story of the consequences of conflict.
On 2 December 2010, the *Economist* ran a two-page story entitled ‘A Commodity Still in Short Supply’. The commodity in question was democracy in the Arab world. The article discussed the continuing conspicuous absence of democracies in the region and noted that at present there were few, if any, signs of cracks in the authoritarian ceiling. Not only did all of the region’s regimes seem solid, but in many cases liberalizing processes that had been started in the 1990s had recently been reversed.

As government responses to recent protest movements in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya illustrate, most MENA regimes have evolved into brutal police states. They lack channels for the expression of disagreement and respond to any challenge with repression. As a consequence, rioting become the sole avenue through which civil society might voice opposition in the region, but participating in such activities involves the risk that one will encounter the full oppressive apparatus of the state. Our analysis shows that the tax base of these regimes is key for understanding these developments. Samuel Huntington wrote in his book *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (1991: 65) that ‘no taxation without representation was a political demand; no representation without taxation is a political reality’. Instead of taxing the population, regimes in the MENA region focus on earning rents – through oil production, direct transfers, and transfer and shipping fees. These regimes thus have a revenue base that is independent of the population. Leaders of the regimes use this resource base to shore up their own governing coalitions, taking particular care to ensure that the armed forces remain happy. Conflict plays a central role in this scenario. In many regions of the world, conflict has been a catalyst for social change. Most commonly, however, conflict is shown to have detrimental effects in terms of economic development. Conflict is both a consequence of underdevelopment and a cause of it. This creates a spiral that has the potential to lock countries in a conflict trap. In the MENA region, we find clear traces of such an economic conflict trap. Wars have a lingering effect on growth; conflict both pushes a country off its initial growth path and slows it down long after a conflict has ended. However, the gravest consequences of conflict in the MENA region are not economic but political. Whereas many African countries are caught in an economic conflict trap, many MENA countries find themselves in a political conflict trap.

Within the MENA region, conflict increases human rights abuses, inhibits democratization and exacerbates social fragility. Furthermore, the political effects of conflict appear to be considerably more detrimental for MENA countries than for war-torn countries in other regions. A MENA country that has experienced a protracted war has a significantly higher probability of being in a situation where murders, disappearance and torture are a common part of life. The mechanism behind this is state securitization. War induces insecurity for leaders, which causes them to resort to political incarceration, brutal subjugation and torture. As noted above, the refreshing spray of a democratic wave has by and large failed to reach MENA’s shores. The region’s authoritarian and semi-democratic regimes are, by global standards, remarkably stable and long-lived. Regimes with little or no constraints on the scope and authority of the executive seem to enjoy a significant war dividend. That is, unconstrained regimes that have experienced conflict endure much longer than those that have not. The pattern seen elsewhere in the world, where wars often act as a catalyst for positive social change, is thus wholly absent in the MENA region.

The consequences of conflict, however, are not merely confined to politics. Conflict increases infant mortality rates, decreases life expectancy and increases the proportion of the population without adequate access to potable water. This conflict burden is directly linked to state securitization: securitization diverts resources away from building and rebuilding health infrastructure or adequate sewage and water systems, and this exacerbates mortality. The cause of increased mortality is not combat but rather the fact that oppressive and inefficient regimes find themselves caught in a political conflict trap.
Sexual Violence in African Conflicts

In Africa, sexual violence is mostly indiscriminate, committed by some conflict actors but not all, often committed by state armies, often committed in years with low levels of killings, and often committed post-conflict.

In order to effectively stop sexual violence in armed conflict, interventions need to be based on systematic knowledge not only of the scale of the problem but also of several other dimensions:

- What types of conflict actors commit sexual violence?
- Who is targeted? Who falls victim? And why?
- What forms does sexual violence take (e.g. gang rape, sexual mutilation or slavery)?
- What is the magnitude of sexual violence committed?
- How do these patterns vary across time and space?

The Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict (SVAC) project is a response to the need for better data on these dimensions. The project aims to establish the most comprehensive database of wartime sexual violence to date. The SVAC core research team consists of Inger Skjelsbæk (Project Manager, PRIO/CSCW), Ragnhild Nordås (CSCW), Dara Kay Cohen (University of Minnesota), Scott Gates (CSCW) and Håvard Strand (CSCW). The project has conducted a pilot study of sexual violence related to conflicts in 20 African countries for the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, encompassing 177 armed conflict actors – state armies, militias and rebel groups.

Not All Groups Rape Not all armed actors in African conflicts engage in sexual violence. The majority of armed actors had no known record of sexual violence beyond isolated episodes. It should be noted, however, that not all cases of sexual violence are reported. Although sexual violence is rampant in many conflicts, a significant number of conflict actors do not seem to commit crimes of sexual violence. Even in conflicts with high reported levels of sexual violence, some groups seem to refrain from committing such acts. Sexual violence is thus not an inevitable fact of war for all actors.

Declining Number of Perpetrators In African conflicts, both the number and the percentage of conflict actors reported as having used sexual violence has been slowly decreasing over the period 2000–09. However, an interesting pattern emerges: The downward trend is not seen among groups that commit extremely high levels of sexual violence, but it is quite clear for groups that are reported to use sexual violence infrequently. Over time, groups seem to be gravitating towards either high levels of sexual violence or none at all.

States Frequent Perpetrators A striking feature of sexual violence in Africa is that the data show that state actors are more likely to be reported as having committed acts of sexual violence than rebel groups and militias.

We should therefore not assume that only unruly rebels engage in sexual violence; such behaviour is very much an aspect of the warfare of government armies, and the available evidence does not suggest that governments only delegate sexual violence to militias.

Temporal Variation Armed groups often change their sexual violence behaviour over time. The fact that an actor has committed sexual violence in the past does not necessarily entail that the same actor will engage in similar activity in the future.

Mostly Indiscriminate In some African conflicts of the last decade, sexual violence has been characterized by selective targeting of victims. Yet, in most of the sample, we find fewer reports of selective targeting than during many of the wars of the 1990s. State militaries, rebel groups and militias often commit sexual violence without a clear purposeful selection of victims: the violence seems indiscriminate.

Different from Killing Pattern Many armed actors perpetrate sexual violence in periods when they are largely inactive on the regular battlefield. This holds true both for state and for non-state armed actors.

More Than Rape Although rape is the most commonly reported form of sexual violence, we see considerable variation in the types of sexual violence in African conflicts.

There are numerous reports of gang rape, sexual slavery, sexual torture, rape with objects and sexual mutilation, along with – more rarely – reports of forced marriage and forced pregnancy. Rapes occurred in front of family members and in public spaces, and some victims were abducted and forced both to provide sexual favours for soldiers and to perform menial labour. There are some reported instances of sexual violence by proxy – when people were forced to rape others, often their own family members. This form of violation was reported in five of the conflicts: Uganda, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Burundi and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).

Post-Conflict Continuation Sexual violence often persists after the battle deaths have ended. In the first five post-conflict years, there were reports of sexual violence by one-quarter of state armies and about one-third of all rebel groups and militias after they ended their battle-related killings.

CSCW MA Students in 2010

Torbjørn Graff Hugo

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Climate and War

Climate change represents one of the main challenges to the emerging liberal peace. Numerous pundits and politicians have claimed that there will be dramatic consequences if global warming continues unchecked. So far, however, there has been little peer-reviewed research on the connection between climate change and war, while the assessment reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change have made only scattered comments, which frequently lack a solid foundation in research.

On 21–24 June 2010, a CSCW-organized conference on ‘Climate Change and Security’ was held in Trondheim on the occasion of the 250th anniversary of the Royal Norwegian Society for Sciences and Letters (Det Kongelige Norske Videnskabers Selskab), Norway’s oldest scientific society. Financial sponsorship for the event was provided by the Society and the Research Council of Norway.

The purpose of the conference was to examine the broad security implications of climate change. Increasingly the debate about climate change has focused on social implications, including the implications for security and peace. However, as yet there has been little academic work in this area. While the science of climate change has a firm basis in peer-reviewed publications, the literature on the security implications remains more speculative. The aim of the conference was therefore to move knowledge of this topic forward through the joint efforts of scholars from multiple fields. Eleven plenary speakers and 41 papers discussed various mechanisms – such as drought, natural disaster, migration and economic decline – that could translate a hotter climate into a more conflictive human environment.

Among others, the conference received attention from the Economist, which reported on a number of alarmist assumptions made about climate change and war, along with the lack of evidence for any direct connection between the two. One claim that came under particular scrutiny predicts a 50% increase in the likelihood of civil war on the African continent by 2030 as a result of climate change.

During the conference, CSCW researcher Halvard Buhaug presented a paper that was subsequently published in the prestigious Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (PNAS) as a direct response to some of the claimed evidence surrounding heightened risk of war in Africa with climate change. In it, he investigated the empirical foundations for the claimed relationship in detail. Drawing on a host of different model specifications and alternative measures of drought, heat and civil war, Buhaug’s article concludes that climate variability is a poor predictor of armed conflict. Instead, African civil wars can be explained in terms of generic structural and contextual conditions: high levels of ethno-political exclusion, poor national economies and the collapse of the Cold War system. The article resulted in worldwide media interest and its findings were reported by the BBC, the New Scientist, Le Monde, Time, Der Standard and in many other media channels.

All of the material from the conference can be found at www.dknvs.no/climsec, and a selection of papers are currently under review for a special issue of Journal of Peace Research in early 2012.
Education and Armed Conflict

In recent years, the links between education and conflict have attracted increasing interest from researchers in both fields. In an effort to unpack this complex relationship, CSCW researchers Gudrun Østby and Henrik Urdal were commissioned to carry out a background study for UNESCO’s 2011 Education for All Global Monitoring Report on The Hidden Crisis: Armed Conflict and Education. Their background study systematized the different theoretical contributions and empirical findings contained in the literature, distinguishing between arguments relating to the levels, expansion, inequality and content of educational programmes.

Positive Trends, But Not Sufficient At the World Education Forum held in Dakar in 2000, 164 governments pledged to achieve ‘Education for All’ (EFA) and identified six key goals to be met by 2015. Among these are ensuring free primary education for all, along with equal rights to education for boys and girls. The past decade has witnessed extraordinary progress towards the achievement of the EFA goals in some of the world’s poorest countries. However, despite these positive developments, the world is not on track to achieve the goals by 2015. Countries affected by armed conflict are among the farthest from reaching the EFA goals.

Higher Levels of Education Breed Peace Most of the propositions in the literature share the premise that more education fosters peace, for three reasons:

- Increased government spending on education can reduce people’s grievances, both directly and indirectly through spurring economic development and social equality.
- Increased educational opportunities make it less attractive for young people to enlist as soldiers rather than pursuing a civilian career.
- Higher educational attainment may promote a ‘culture of peace’ that encourages political participation and channels conflicts of interest through peaceful political institutions.

The most common indicator of educational level relates to enrolment in or completion of secondary education. This seems to provide the most useful discriminator for assessing the role of education in conflict. However, it seems that increasing education at any level is good for peace and stability.

Rapid Expansion Is Not a Threat There has been some concern that expanding higher education too rapidly could increase the risk of political instability if this produces a larger group of highly educated young people than a country or region’s labour market is able to absorb. High levels of unemployment among highly educated youths may cause frustration and grievances that could in turn motivate political violence. So far, only three studies have tested this argument. According to their joint findings, expansion in higher education seems to have no bearing on the risk of political violence – not even in the context of large youth bulges.

Educational Inequality Matters Further, it is assumed that inequalities of educational opportunities between individuals and groups could breed grievances and cause conflict. For example, schooling policies might be used by governments to discriminate against certain minority groups, and this could enhance group grievances among disfavoured groups and cause them to mobilize against the state in an attempt to alter the status quo.

The overall conflict potential of disparities in educational opportunities seems to be consistent with a key finding in the broader inequality–conflict literature: The form of inequality that has the greatest potential for provoking conflict is when educational differences overlap with other cleavages in society, such as ethnicity, religion and/or regional affiliation. There is also some evidence that higher levels of educational inequalities between boys and girls enhance the risk of conflict.

Micro-Level Effects Evidence from Colombia and Sierra Leone indicates that low levels of education lead to an increase in the level of participation by individuals in both insurgent and counterinsurgent groups. On the other hand, there is emerging evidence from the Middle East that highly educated individuals are overrepresented in terrorist activities. These latter results are preliminary, however, and thus uncertain. Such overrepresentation, if confirmed, might be the result of educational content being directly used to promote terrorism. Another possible explanation is that the higher-than-average education levels among terrorists are a selection effect, whereby more highly educated and qualified recruits are chosen over their less qualified counterparts.

The findings were presented at the Norwegian launch of the Global Monitoring Report in Oslo on 17 March 2011. CSCW also contributed to the report with a commissioned paper presenting the background for EFA’s conflict, post-conflict and no-conflict categories, authored by Håvard Strand and Marianne Dahl.
Important dynamics of civil wars transgress national boundaries. External factors can be international, such as the engagement of one state in another’s conflicts, or they can be transnational, as when armed groups mobilize across borders or when new norms, ideas and practices spread from one conflict location to another. This working group is committed to theory development, addressing insights and limitations in the literatures on civil war, transnationalism and international relations. We do not favour one particular theory or approach, seeking instead to develop synthetic, plural arguments that better capture the complex dynamics of civil conflict. This stance of theoretical pluralism informs our choice of methods, which range from case studies, to large-n quantitative work, to ethnography, to agent-based modelling. Ultimately, we aim to understand and explain the myriad interactions between the international/transnational and the local/internal in civil war.

This group defines the environment in the broad sense of physical factors that condition human affairs, such as distance, mountains, rivers, forest cover and availability of natural resources. Environmental factors play an important role in assessing neomalthusian vs. ‘cornucopian’ theories of conflict. What are the effects of resource scarcity and abundance? Is climate change associated with conflict? What role does cooperation play vs. conflict in a situation of scarcity? We also consider the demographic aspect of neomalthusian concerns, as well as ethnic distinctions as potential causes of conflict and as convenient ways of organizing conflicts.

Civil Conflict and Economic Performance
Leader: Karl Ove Moene, University of Oslo

This working group aims at integrating the effect of conflicts on economic performance and the role of economic conditions for the onset of conflicts within formal economic models. This is an important challenge. It implies a widening of the scope of economics to integrate social issues and things that really matter. The group’s research agenda is built on an implicit criticism of technocratic mainstream economics for its lack of a coherent treatment of conflicts and neglect of social mechanisms. In contrast, this group tries to make a case for analysis that combines social and economic factors while acknowledging their interdependence. The working group is a ‘joint venture’ of CSCW and of the Centre of Excellence at the University of Oslo on Equality, Social Organization, and Performance (ESOP).

Values and Violence
Leader: Ola Listhaug, NTNU

Our study of values, attitudes and public opinion looks at violent societies and generally peaceful societies, as well as countries undergoing a transition away from violence. The main aim is to demonstrate if and how values are related to violence in societies. One important empirical focus is the impact of religion, but we also study tolerance, trust, prejudice and respect for human rights, and how these values vary between countries and relate to conflicts between groups within societies. In postwar societies, we study values to assess the strength of latent conflict.

Civil Peace
Leader: Kaare Strøm, UCSD

The main aim of this group is to explore the conditions that constitute and promote civil peace. This entails analysing the processes of conflict resolution as well as the social, economic and political conditions that lead to civil peace. To better understand long-term peacebuilding, we focus on the development of institutions that can serve to mitigate or supplant the conditions that cause and sustain armed civil conflict, for instance transitional governance, transitional justice and various forms of power-sharing.

Human Rights, Governance and Conflict
Leader: Sabine Carey, University of Mannheim

Conflict and human rights violations are closely intertwined. During a civil war, torture and political killings are particularly common. But, governing structures also affect the respect shown by governments for the human rights of their citizens and influence the dynamics of conflict. This working group aims to disentangle the triangular relationship between human rights, governance and conflict. We focus on the role of human rights and governing structures during the escalation of conflict, their contribution to the severity and duration of conflict, and their role in establishing a viable and secure peace after the cessation of warfare. Our research pays particular attention to the interaction between the agents of violence, the harm civilians incur during conflict and the mediating role of political institutions.

Dynamics of Institutional Change and Conflict
Leader: Håvard Hegre, PRIO

This working group studies the interplay of the processes of civil war onset and termination, changes to political institutions, and the societal changes brought about by ‘modernization’. These changes have closely related explanations. Democracies fail to prevent conflict in the developing world in part because they are vulnerable to reversals to authoritarian rule—often by means of violence. Similarly, democratization is a political conflict that sometimes turns violent. Socio-economic factors affect strategies and goals of the parties to the political conflict. At the same time, political stability affects societal changes. The group brings together specialists on different aspects of this nexus, and also seeks to identify institutions that may lift countries out of the ‘conflict trap’.
This dissertation examines the role of power-sharing in post-conflict societies. The term power-sharing refers to a type of governing system that aims to include multiple political actors in decision-making processes. Such an approach is increasingly being adopted in relation to peace agreements and political crises, but researchers disagree as to whether power-sharing brings peace or recurring conflict. The dissertation demonstrates that this disagreement stems from different understandings of power-sharing: what it is, how it should work, and how to study it. The dissertation contains both statistical analyses of power-sharing in all internal armed conflicts since World War II and a thorough analysis of power-sharing following the Sierra Leonean civil war (1991–2002). Four conclusions are drawn: (1) power-sharing can strengthen peace, but the effect depends on the type and context of the approach adopted; (2) mass-level inclusion is as important as elite inclusion; (3) broad-based and inclusive institutions may limit the ability of governments to use violence against their own citizens and at the same time may deradicalize rebel groups and reduce their motivation to restart a conflict; and (4) implementation is crucial; by studying what actually happens on the ground, we can learn more about the mechanisms that link power-sharing to durable peace. Together, these conclusions add useful knowledge to our understanding of the potential role of power-sharing in war-torn societies.

While recent quantitative research concludes that economic inequality is unrelated to civil conflict, qualitative case studies suggest that what matters for political violence are so-called horizontal inequalities (HIs), or systematic inequalities between identity groups. However, since case studies are not well suited for making broad generalizations, testing the statistical relationship between HIs and conflict is much warranted. Drawing on household surveys from a large number of developing countries, this dissertation offers new systematic data on horizontal inequalities, measured across various group identifiers (ethnic, religious, regional, migrant-based) and along various dimensions (economic, social, political). Specifying various theoretical arguments, the individual articles test the link between HIs and political violence, and whether the relationship is conditioned by different political, economic and demographic contextual factors. The conflict potential of HIs is evaluated with regard to various forms of politically motivated violence, ranging from civil conflict to low-scale urban violence, and at different levels of analysis (national, regional, local). In sum, the statistical analyses corroborate the findings from the case-based literature, demonstrating that horizontal inequalities are indeed associated with higher levels of political violence.

Water is an essential resource for human survival. It is also of great importance to industrial development and trade. This project builds on earlier research on conflict and cooperation in the context of internationally shared rivers, but extends the focus to examine the overall interaction process — with conflict and cooperation studied together instead of separately. More specifically, the project examines whether countries that share rivers interact more — whether positively or negatively. It also investigates the effect of signed water treaties on subsequent water-specific interaction. Through issue-coding of claims over the use of a river raised by one state towards another, it looks at specific water disagreements and whether or not they become militarized.

This dissertation is a study of the morality and international regulation of postwar reconstruction within the modern tradition of just war theory. Postwar reconstruction appears in this tradition as an imperative of the aftermath of war, which is in turn viewed as the third morally relevant period of war-making. The first two periods relate to the decision to go to war and the conduct of actual warfare, and the full study of just wars consists in the study of each period, as well as their conceptual and normative connections. The doctrine that postwar reconstruction is of more recent coinage, but I use it as the natural counterpart to the other two expressions. Over the last 50 years, the first two periods of war have received far more scholarly attention than the third, though postwar justice has long been a well-established area of study in the just war tradition. Within this tradition, a war is deemed fully just if and only if it is the outcome of a just decision, is fought justly and ends justly.

Civil wars have a way of attracting foreign interventions. According to one count, external countries intervened in 89 of 138 civil wars during the period 1944–94. Though the correlates of intervention are manifold, this project deals with one in particular: transnational ethnic affinities. Several studies suggest that transnational ethnic affinities are associated with interventions in civil wars. When parties to civil wars have ethnic kin in other countries, the involvement of those countries is more likely. Although ample theoretical and comparative work supports the notion that transnational ethnic affinities are associated with interventions, it remains an empirical regularity in need of explanation. This project begins the search for such an explanation. Its central question is thus: By what mechanisms are third-party military interventions in civil wars linked with transnational ethnic affinities?
Much conflict research has focused on why civil conflicts break out and how they are sustained, but less attention has been paid to the consequences of conflict and how these effects develop over time. Focusing on the Yugoslav successor states, the aim of this project is to analyse the extent to which individual attitudes like tolerance and political trust are affected by conflict, and what implications this may have for society. The project is based on individual survey data as well as context variables on both regional and national levels.

This project investigates whether natural disasters may have caused increased levels of conflict in India in the past. Bearing in mind warnings from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) that natural disasters can be expected to increase in strength and frequency in coming years, the project focuses on climate-related disasters, such as droughts, floods and storms. Given the relevance of climate changes, considerations of whether past patterns can be used to predict future trends is an integral part of the project.

The vast majority of civil wars occur in economically less developed countries. Several different explanations for this have been suggested, but little has yet been done to assess them empirically. This project uses various empirical approaches to identify important causal mechanisms and their links to development-related conditions: a within-country comparative case study of insurgent mobilization in Nepal, a quantitative study of the spatial diffusion of insurgency in Nepal, and two global large-N studies looking at the determinants of civil war outbreak.

The cross-national conflict literature has failed to converge on robust associations that could link resource scarcities with civil war. It has been suggested that droughts increase the risk of violent conflict and that this is most pronounced with smaller-scale local conflicts. This project uses both single-case and cross-national statistical investigations to analyse the possible relationships between climatic factors, resource scarcities and violent conflict. It includes a quantitative case study of Kenya, a global analysis and a disaggregated analysis of Africa in general.

Dissertation Advisers: Nils Peter Gleditsch (CSCW/NTNU) & Halvard Buhaug (PRIO)

The present PhD project in Political Science explores two key questions. Firstly, what are the key causes of urban violence and insecurity in the Global South, and secondly, what effect do the quality and types of urban governance and management of cities have on conflict and security in these cities. The project will employ a mixed methods design, utilising a series of city-level and disaggregated quantitative analyses combined with in-depth case studies. A key goal is to build knowledge on the local politics of urban security, and understand how the nature of violence may change with population shifts to urban areas in the near future.

Dissertation Advisers: Henrik Urdal (PRIO)
CSCW Selected Publications in 2010

For a complete list of 2010 publications, see http://www.prio.no/CSCW/Research-and-Publications/Publications/

Monographs


Edited Volumes


Peer-Reviewed Journal Articles


CSCW Projects in 2010

Total project income in 2010 was NOK 26,624,085. The CoE grant counts for 41.3% of this, and the chart depicts the breakdown of the remaining 58.7%. A total number of 67 people were employed or visiting the Centre, which resulted in 24.7 person-years (one person year is the equivalent of one full-time position for a year).
PRIO

PRIO was founded in 1959. It was one of the first centres of peace research in the world, and it is Norway’s only peace research institute. PRIO is an autonomous, non-profit foundation that is independent and international in staff and perspective. Research at PRIO concentrates on the driving forces behind violent conflict and on ways in which peace can be built, maintained and spread. In addition to theoretical and empirical research, PRIO also conducts policy-oriented activities and engages in the search for solutions in cases of actual or potential violent conflict.

Centre of Excellence

Centre of Excellence (CoE) is a distinction accorded to CSCW by the Research Council of Norway. The CoE scheme was introduced in Norway with the intention of bringing more researchers and research groups up to a high international standard. In 2002, after an extensive and competitive selection process led by international experts, the council awarded CoE status to 13 of 129 applicants. PRIO’s proposal was judged to be of ‘exceptionally high scientific quality’. The total number of Centres rose to 21 in 2006 when a new round of applications was held in addition to a midway evaluation of all existing CoEs. CSCW secured a second five-year period of funding after the evaluation, again receiving top scores from the referees.
‘The Centre has become the leading international research environment in research on civil war... [the] level of quality of the research is exceptionally good’

Anonymous expert’s appraisal for the midway evaluation of CSCW as a CoE.