Over the course of two decades, more than 220,000 Cypriots lost their homes and properties, initially as a result of inter-communal violence in the 1950s and 1960s and later because of the war and subsequent division of the island in 1974. Property issues arising from these past internal displacements have become intertwined with the competing political and geostrategic aims of the two Cypriot communities, and have thus remained unresolved to this day. Moreover, with the passage of time these issues have turned into legally and technically the most complicated part of the Cyprus dispute; they are also central to economic and social considerations in the event of a peace agreement.

Significantly, the issue of displaced persons' rights also has a complex emotional aspect. This is because it has had, and continues to have, a direct impact on the lives of individuals and local communities, more than any other aspect of the Cyprus problem. Most Cypriots link the issue of displaced persons' rights with the wrongs done to them by the other community; the loss of homes, property and livelihoods; ancestral lands; original habitats and cultural artefacts; and the social life that surrounded them. Thus, there are highly emotive, normative and personal sentiments surrounding the issue. These sentiments will not fade away quickly and probably will continue to frame collective imaginations even after a formal solution of the issue is attained, complicating the implementation of such a solution.

This report presents an overview of the various phases of population displacements in Cyprus, as well as a synopsis of the political, legal, social and psychological consequences of conflict-related displacement.

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DISPLACEMENT IN CYPRUS
CONSEQUENCES OF CIVIL AND MILITARY STRIFE

Report 5

AN OVERVIEW OF EVENTS AND PERCEPTIONS

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INTRODUCTION

For persons displaced by violent conflict, return to one’s home and property in peacetime is a hope and often an expectation. In divided Cyprus that hope has become a political problem. This makes the issue of displaced persons’ property-related rights perhaps the biggest challenge to the Cyprus peace process and indeed a major obstacle to inter-communal reconciliation.

Over the course of two decades, more than 220,000 Cypriots lost their homes and properties, initially as a result of inter-communal violence in the 1950s and 1960s and later because of the war and subsequent division of the island in 1974. Property issues arising from these past internal displacements have become intertwined with the competing political and geostrategic aims of the two Cypriot communities, and have thus remained unresolved to this day. Moreover, with the passage of time these issues have turned into legally and technically the most complicated part of the Cyprus dispute; they are also central to economic and social considerations in the event of a peace agreement.

The situation resulting from displacement has a crucial bearing on the whole question of individual rights of both those who lost their homes and properties and those who subsequently took over those properties. Such people constitute a large part of the population on both sides of the island. During the last two decades, a number of cases related to the right to enjoyment of property and home have been brought before the European Court of Human Rights, mostly by Greek Cypriots and in recent years increasingly by Turkish Cypriots as well.

Significantly, the issue of displaced persons’ rights also has a complex emotional aspect. This is because it has had, and continues to have, a direct impact on the lives of individuals and local communities, more than any other aspect of the Cyprus problem. Most Cypriots link the issue of displaced persons’ rights with the wrongs done to them by the other community; the loss of homes, property and livelihoods; ancestral lands; original habitats and cultural artefacts; and the social life that surrounded them. Thus, there are highly emotive, normative and personal sentiments surrounding the issue. These sentiments will not fade away quickly and probably will continue to frame collective imaginations even after a formal solution of the issue is attained, complicating the implementation of such a solution.

This report presents an overview of the various phases of population displacements in Cyprus, as well as a synopsis of the political, legal, social and psychological consequences of conflict-related displacement. Section 1 gives an account of population movements before the period of inter-communal conflict; displacements of the Emergency Years of 1955-59; and
the different stages of displacement during the inter-communal strife of the 1960s and later as a result of the war of 1974. Section 2 examines the political positions and policies relating to the issue of displaced persons adopted on both sides of the island. Section 3 gives a brief outline of the situation at the European Court of Human Rights regarding the cases of lost property brought before it by dispossessed Cypriots. Finally, section 4 presents the findings of a series of focus group discussions aimed at exploring the sentiments and concerns of individuals and local communities affected by displacement. This section gives insight into displaced persons’ perceptions regarding issues of return, property claims, solution prospects and the negotiations.
1. CONFLICT AND DISPLACEMENT

On the evening of 26 May 1956, the church bells of Afania village in the central Mesaoria suddenly began to ring. Because of recent EOKA activities in nearby villages, tensions were already building in Afania, as they were in other villages and towns in Cyprus. In response to the ringing bells, the Greek Cypriot residents rushed to the center of the village to discover that two young, hooded men on a motorcycle had attacked Afania's Greek Cypriot coffee shop and fired at the patrons drinking their usual after-work coffee. Although no one was killed in the shootings, seven of the villagers, including the priest's son-in-law, were slightly wounded. The attack terrified the villagers, many of whom believed that they had been assaulted by their own Turkish Cypriot neighbours. In anger, some grabbed improvised weapons such as tools and sticks and headed towards the Turkish Cypriot neighbourhood. Meanwhile, the Greek Cypriots of neighbouring Asha had also heard the bells ringing and began to ascend towards Afania with large sticks and other weapons. As they approached the village, some of the fields on the outskirts of Afania were set on fire.

In the midst of this commotion, a Turkish Cypriot from Afania who worked for the Royal Air Force as an auxiliary police officer arrived in the village with his nephew on the back of his motorbike. Apparently, he had heard the church bells and had seen smoke and fire from a distance while attending a wedding in nearby Orniti village. Thinking that Afania was burning, he left the wedding party and rushed back to the village to see if anyone needed help. However, when he approached the confused and angry crowd milling outside the coffee shop and asked what had happened, one of the men turned around and hit him with a stick, claiming that he was behind the shooting. After the first blow, he understood that something serious was happening, and he tried to calm the crowd by calling their names. But another blow came from behind, and by the time the British police arrived in the village the Turkish Cypriot policeman had been lynched by the angry crowd, which was convinced that he was behind the attack against the coffee shop.

That evening many of the Afania Turkish Cypriots fled to nearby Turkish Cypriot villages, while others moved into the inner parts of their neighbourhood and established a more secure area for themselves, erecting barricades and taking out their hunting rifles. By the time British soldiers arrived in the village, the two sides had completely separated and positioned themselves in what they perceived as more secure areas. However, this incident had a spillover effect on neighbouring villages. Many Greek Cypriots from nearby villages took their shotguns and ran to aid the Afania Greek Cypriots, anticipating an eruption of further violence. The Turkish Cypriots of nearby Asha village fled their homes following arson attacks on their property and sought refuge in other...
Turkish Cypriot dominated villages, remaining in those places until 1974, when they finally returned to their village.¹

Although it later became clear that the two men who had fired on the coffee shop had come from elsewhere to take revenge for the assassination of a Turkish Cypriot policeman a week before, the cycle of fear and violence ignited by this incident would have lasting effects on the social fabric of the region. The incident in Afania and flight of the Asha Turkish Cypriots also marked the first forced displacement of the Cyprus conflict, which would ultimately result in the uprooting of more than 220,000 Cypriots and total segregation of the communities. Although much of the ethnic homogenization of the Cypriot villages took place long before the emergency years of the 1950s, this first officially recognized conflict-related displacement in May 1956 was followed by similar waves of displacement as a result of inter-communal and intra-communal tensions, waves of violence, and the eventual division of the island in 1974.

1.1 FORCED MIGRATION BETWEEN THE WORLD WARS

Until the displacement that was caused by the inter-communal disturbances of the second half of the 1950s, Cyprus was more of a receiving country for displaced persons from nearby countries. During and after the First World War, Cyprus became the host for many Armenian and Greek refugees who were fleeing Anatolia. Many Armenians who were deported from Turkey or fled the atrocities of 1915 sought refuge in Cyprus. Approximately 9,000 Armenian refugees arrived in Cyprus, and of these approximately 1,300 chose to stay on the island (Hadjilyra 2009: 15). This period also witnessed the exodus of many Muslims to Turkey. After the Ottomans entered into the First World War against the Allies, Britain annexed the island. Following the annexation and the Lausanne agreement in 1924 that ended the nominal Turkish sovereignty over the island, many Muslims left the island and migrated to Turkey. They were given two options: either to become a British citizen and stay on the island or to keep their Turkish citizenship and leave the island (Hill 1952: 413). The 1946 census reveals that the Muslim population percentage on the island dropped from 22% in 1911 to 18% in 1946. Approximately 9,000 Muslims left the island between the years of 1915 and 1938 (Nevzat 2005: 275-282). Although the migration continued on a smaller scale, the majority left the island before 1938. Most of these Muslim refugees were given houses and properties in locations such as Mersin, Adana and Antalya in southern Turkey (Çakmak 2008).

In addition, at the end of the Second World War, between 1945 and 1948, almost 50,000 Jewish refugees from Europe on their way to Palestine were stopped in Cyprus and held in detention camps. After the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948, these Jewish refugees moved on to Israel, and the camps were evacuated.²

¹ This narrative is based on interviews with Afania villagers conducted by Mete Hatay in 2009, as well as newspaper reports from the period.
² http://www.ushmm.org/museum/exhibit/online/dp/emigrat3.htm
1.2 EARLY TRENDS OF ETHNIC HOMOGENIZATION

Apart from the above-mentioned forced migration movements that took place in the first and second quarters of the 20th century, British census figures reveal that during the latter period, the rural areas of the island also began to experience ethnic homogenization. Although some of this internal migration was due to factors such as urbanization, rising ethnic tensions in the villages because of increasing nationalism were often the main driving force behind these movements. According to Eleni Lytras and Charis Psaltis (2011) the number of mixed villages in Cyprus declined from 346 in 1891 to 252 in 1931. From the British records of the period, one can easily see that some of this homogenization was due to inter-communal enmity. Rebecca Bryant, in her report on Turkish Cypriot displacement (2012: 5), notes that,

*Explanations for this homogenization may often be found in archival sources, though these sources have not been consistently compiled. One example is the Famagusta village of Akanthou, which had a small Turkish population at the turn of the century. In 1910, Akanthou's Turkish Cypriot villagers complained to the British administration that their imam had been insulted and the mosque defiled, and they wished to be moved outside the village (Cyprus State archive, 1000/1910, Complaint of Turks of Akanthou of persecution by their Christian co-villagers, 31 May 1910). By ten years later, the number of Turkish Cypriots in the village had dropped from 61 to 21, and they later disappeared from the village altogether.*

A similar process of homogenization took place in other villages throughout the island. The usual trend was for an ethnic group in a numerical minority to gradually abandon their village for what they perceived as safer locations of ethnic concentration. During this process, those persons in the minority ethnic group tended to sell their properties to persons in the majority ethnic group, indicating a permanent relocation (Nevzat 2005: 200).

1.3 DISPLACEMENT DURING THE EMERGENCY YEARS OF 1955-59

In 1955, Greek Cypriots dissatisfied with British colonial rule established the National Organization of Cypriot Fighters (Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston or EOKA) to achieve enosis, the union of Cyprus with Greece. Turkish Cypriots countered by joining forces with the British administration as auxiliary police, hired to help quell the rebellion. Although EOKA refrained from targeting Turkish Cypriots because of fear of drawing Turkey into the conflict, the killing of Turkish Cypriot auxiliary police tended to be interpreted by Turkish Cypriots as an attack on them as members of an ethnic community, and revenge violence became common. Riots and arson attacks against Greek Cypriot targets became common after killings of Turkish Cypriot policemen (Holland 1998:133). These acts were mostly committed by youth, who were eventually incorporated into underground organizations, such as Volkan, Kara Çete, and 9 September. By late 1957, members of the Turkish Cypriot leadership had also formed TMT (the Turkish Resistance Organisation), an armed movement demanding taksim, or partition of the island. TMT brought other guerrilla organizations under its control, and its emergence led
to the further escalation of inter-communal violence in summer 1958 and the displacement of many Greek and Turkish Cypriots. Historian Robert Holland claims that, ‘Whereas Turkish violence against Greeks took place mainly in towns, and was essentially part of a calculated political strategy, Greek violence against Turks tended to be more random and to occur in rural areas—most at risk were Turkish shepherds going about their daily and isolated tasks’ (Holland 1998: 265). As a result most of those Greek Cypriots displaced in this period were from Turkish-dominated neighbourhoods or on the edges of those neighbourhoods, such as Ayios Lukas or Selimiye, while Turkish Cypriots fled the villages where they were a minority.

During this period, approximately 2,700 Turkish Cypriots from 36 villages and 1,900 Greek Cypriots from Nicosia and eight villages were displaced. Apart from the homogenization of these 44 villages, Nicosia was also divided, as Greek Cypriots from the Ayios Lukas neighbourhood and Turkish Cypriots from the Ömeriye neighbourhood were displaced and barbed wire was erected in the city’s centre. In 1958, Turkish Cypriots proclaimed a separate municipality in the north of the city. In addition, this period witnessed an increasing nationalization of daily life that was itself divisive, as flags and nationalist slogans and symbols multiplied, while both communities engaged in campaigns to ‘ethnicize’ the landscape, including changing place names (Holland 1998: 264-265).4

Following the declaration of the Republic of Cyprus in 1959, almost half of the Turkish Cypriots displaced in 1958 returned to their villages, while only a small number of Greek Cypriots returned. For example, approximately 70 Greek Cypriots returned to Lefke, but this was barely 10% of those displaced from the town. Turkish Cypriot return was aided by the Cyprus Turkish Federation of Organizations (Kıbrıs Türk Kurumlar Federasyonu), which began a campaign to rebuild neighbourhoods that had been damaged or destroyed in order to facilitate displaced persons’ return.

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3 Our fieldwork data indicate that the village and neighbourhoods from which Greek Cypriots were displaced were the Ayios Loucas and Selimiye neighborhoods of Nicosia; Ayios Antonios neighbourhood of Limassol; walled city of Famagusta; Lefke and Louroudjina in the Nicosia district; Marona, Souskiou, and Mandria in the Paphos district; Alektora in Limassol district; and Kellia and Menoyia in Larnaka district. Turkish Cypriots evacuated the following neighbourhoods and villages and did not return: Büyük Kaymaklı, Pano Lakatamia, Analias, Katalonias, Pavlophorou, Asha, Poyokiki, Peristeron Piyis, Ayios Seryios, Spathariko, Vassili, Melanaga, Amargeti, Psimolophou, and Anarita. Villages that Turkish Cypriots evacuated in 1958 and to which they wholly or partially returned with establishment of the republic were: Kato Lakatamia, Kato Dheftera, Aredhiou, Morphou, Dhio Potami, Ayios Epikititos, Aradhi, Ayios Theodhoroas, Lythrangomi, Kílanemos, Alethiko, Anglisidhes, Pissouri, Kritou Marottou, Prastio, Lembra, Akournos, and Tima (Patrick 1976: 97-98). Additionally, Turkish Cypriots evacuated some neighbourhoods of Nicosia, especially the Ömeriye neighbourhood, and did not return.

4 While Greek Cypriots had changed street names in the major cities since the late 1940s, using names from ancient Greek history and mythology, in 1958 the Turkish Cypriots began to change names both in their own municipalities and for those 135 villages that were mainly inhabited by Turkish Cypriots. Shortly before the inter-communal clashes of June 1958, according to a British diplomat who wrote down his observation of the political landscape, Greek political choreography was more visible: “Each village was plastered with Greek flags on every single house”.... “The casual visitor, as Parsons concluded his description of Cyprus, “can travel from end to end of the island completely unaware that Turks existed there. Very occasionally a mosque can be seen or a broken-down advertisement in Turkish. But the overwhelming impression is Greek in towns and villages-churches, roads, advertisements, place names” (Holland 1998: 240).
1.4 DISPLACEMENT DURING THE 1960s INTER-COMMUNAL STRIFE

In 1960, at the time the Republic of Cyprus (RoC) was established, Greek Cypriots constituted almost 77% of the total population, while Turkish Cypriots comprised a numerical minority of 18%. The RoC constitution was based on a power-sharing model, and the maintenance of constitutional order was guaranteed by Greece, Turkey, and Great Britain. Power-sharing in this case also entailed quotas for distribution of civil service positions, with Turkish Cypriots receiving more than their numerical proportion in a number of offices. Even more significantly, the constitution gave veto power to the Turkish Cypriot vice-president, and this and other elements were seen by many Greek Cypriots to undermine the constitution's functionality. In late 1963, President Makarios proposed a set of amendments to the constitution that were immediately rejected by Turkey, which saw these amendments as a threat to the bicommmunal nature of the constitution. Inter-communal violence broke out and would continue for several months, resulting in the withdrawal of Turkish Cypriots from the government and their retreat into militarized enclaves.

The ensuing months of violence resulted in the displacement of 1,500-2,000 Greek and Armenian Cypriots, and approximately 25,000 Turkish Cypriots (Patrick 1976: 343). Most of these Greek and Armenian Cypriots were displaced from Nicosia neighbourhoods, while Turkish Cypriots were displaced from neighbourhoods and villages throughout the island. Between December 1963 and August 1964, Turkish Cypriots evacuated their neighbourhoods in 72 mixed villages and abandoned 24 Turkish Cypriot villages (Patrick 1976: 340). Additionally, eight mixed villages were partially evacuated. Also, in every one of the six largest towns a partial evacuation of Turkish Cypriots took place. They usually fled to the nearest Turkish Cypriot village or neighbourhood that they perceived as safer than their own. According to Patrick, 442 Greek Cypriot and 231 Armenian houses were either taken over by Turkish Cypriot fighters and allocated to displaced Turkish Cypriots, or were abandoned due to damage caused by fighting (Patrick 1976: 456). According to Patrick, ‘[O]f 233 Turkish-Cypriot centres, 98 stood abandoned by 10 August 1964. Of the 135 that were partially or fully occupied at the time, 20 were under government control and accounted for approximately 8,000 of the Turkish–Cypriot population’ (Patrick 1976: 80). Between December 1963 and August 1964, 364 Turkish Cypriots and 174 Greek Cypriots were killed (Patrick 1976).

Displaced Turkish Cypriots were settled in tents, barns, and other temporary accommodation, such as schools. In Nicosia, as mentioned above, a certain number were additionally settled in the homes of Armenian and Greek Cypriots who had fled to the Greek-controlled part of the city. Although approximately 25% of the Turkish Cypriot population was displaced during this period, almost 90% of the population lived in 42 enclaves. In response to a Greek Cypriot National Guard attack on the Kokkina/Erenköy enclave, which had long served as a bridgehead for smuggling weapons into the island, Turkey intervened with her air-force, bombing and strafing Greek Cypriot military targets and villages in the Tylliria region. After this intervention, a ceasefire was declared in August 1964, which continued until November
1967 with only minor incidents. During this period, the Turkish Cypriot enclaves were put under an economic and military siege, and most goods were not allowed into the enclaves. Among those goods not permitted were building materials, and for this reason it was not possible to construct proper refugee housing until the easing of the siege in 1967. After the siege was over, between 1967 and 1974 Turkish Cypriots were able to build more than 3,000 low-cost housing units in different locations in the above-mentioned enclaves with financial help from Turkey. Political geographer Richard Patrick claims that by 1971 only 2,000 Turkish Cypriot refugees had returned to 22 additional centres under government control (Patrick 1976: 80-81). There are claims that the Turkish Cypriot leadership or TMT may have prevented the return of some Turkish Cypriot displaced persons. For example, when in 1964 certain villagers from Pitargou in Paphos, who had taken refuge in Axylou village, wished to return to their village, the result was a gun-battle in which several people were injured (Patrick 1976: 99). However, our fieldwork suggests that return was usually impeded by safety concerns and in many cases by the destruction of properties. According to Patrick, after the Turkish Cypriots’ departure, ‘most of the abandoned villages and quarters were ransacked and even burned by Greek Cypriots’ (Patrick 1976: 78).

1.5 DISPLACEMENT AND THE DIVISION OF THE ISLAND IN 1974

Tensions on the island decreased in 1968, and in the same year negotiations to solve the Cyprus dispute started, though they did not bear fruit. During this period when inter-communal tension was lower, intra-communal conflict began to emerge in the Greek Cypriot community. The latter conflict was between those who still favoured enosis and those who preferred to sustain the republic that was now under Greek Cypriot control. Eventually, in July 1974, the Greek Cypriot National Guard, which was controlled and supported by the mainland Greek army, attempted to overthrow president Archbishop Makarios and launched a coup to pursue enosis. Five days later, on 20th of July, Turkey responded militarily and took control of 36% of the island and created a Turkish Cypriot-controlled area in its north.

1.5.1 GREEK CYPRIOT DISPLACEMENT

Greek Cypriots were displaced from the northern part of the island in four waves. While the majority of Greek Cypriots fled immediately from the advancing Turkish army, some stayed in their villages and surrendered. The latter were enclaved in various locations in the north, including camps and village neighbourhoods. For instance, those who were enclaved in Kyrenia were gathered in a hotel and later deported to the southern part of the island. Many others

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6 A UN report from 20 September 1964 observed that 977 Turkish Cypriot homes had been totally destroyed and that 2000 had been pillaged and severely damaged (UN document S/5950).
Conflict and Displacement

who were enclaved in various villages were gathered together in village schools, churches or neighbourhoods that were turned into military camps. During this period mistreatment, harassment, rapes and some instances of murder were recorded. Some of those Greek Cypriots enclaved in this way were later expelled to the south, in retaliation for the mistreatment of Turkish Cypriots in the south. In addition, a third wave were the approximately 6,000 Greek Cypriot prisoners of war, many of whom were taken first to Turkey before being released to the south in exchange for Turkish Cypriot prisoners.

Finally, a fourth wave occurred after the leaders of both communities signed the Vienna III Agreement in 1975, which enabled the reunification of families. This allowed the voluntary and assisted movement to the south of those Greek Cypriots still remaining in the north, and of Turkish Cypriots from south to north. This agreement also assured that those who were to stay behind would have all their communal and human rights protected. Although initially there were 10,000 Greek Cypriots who chose to stay in the north, by 1981 their numbers barely reached 1,000. The Greek Cypriot leadership claimed that their gradual departure was due to harassment, discrimination and oppression. Apart from 200 Maronites who chose to remain in Kormakiti village, almost all the Maronites and a much smaller number of Latins and Armenians were also affected. As a result of 1974, almost 162,000 Greek Cypriots (including the other minorities) were displaced.

Those Greek Cypriots who fled from the advancing Turkish army usually sought refuge in safer areas in the south where large refugee camps were established. Almost half of the Greek Cypriot refugees who fled to the south found temporary shelter with friends and relatives, later renting and in some cases by buying houses (King and Ladbury 1982). Those who could not find a friend or relative to host them had to remain in refugee camps. According to one report, ‘Twenty-three large tented camps and 320 distribution centres for food and clothing were set up in order to assist the refugees with immediate necessities’ (Kliot and Mansfeld 1994: 335). Only a small number of displaced farmers had the opportunity of resettling on farmland and restoring their community (Loizos 1981). In 1975, approximately 25,000 Greek Cypriots were resettled in houses abandoned by Turkish Cypriots displaced to the north. After the initial shock to the society of this influx of displaced persons, the government began housing projects to settle them. There were two types of housing project that developed in this period. The first was standard refugee housing, built on government and, in some cases, on Turkish Cypriot land. The second was a self-financing scheme in which a plot of land was given to a displaced family, which was allowed to build on the land at its own expense or with preferential loans.

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7 The Vienna III Agreement was supposed to have enabled the reunification of families including by ‘transfer of a number of Greek Cypriots, at present in the South, to the North’ as well as to have allowed ‘the Greek Cypriots at present in the North of the Island … to stay and … be given every help to lead a normal life, including facilities for education and for the practice of their religion, as well as medical care by their own doctors and freedom of movement in the North’.

8 http://www.cyprusembassy.net/home/index.php?module=page&pid=21
1.6.2 TURKISH CYPRIOΤ DISPLACEMENT

In turn, Turkish Cypriots were also displaced to the north in four waves. Many of those who were near the area that was quickly put under Turkish control fled from the south into this area, which they perceived as safer. Many of those who were farther away from the Green Line found routes to the north. In some cases, this entailed paying a guide to take persons on foot, often over the mountains. Others hired drivers that they trusted, while still others found routes through the Red Crescent, the United Nations, and the British forces, the latter by taking refuge in the British bases. Approximately 10,000 persons who sought refuge in the British bases were transferred to the north via Turkey in January 1975. Another 6,000 men of fighting age who had been taken prisoner in the south and held in stadiums, schools, and other improvised locations were sent to the north in exchange for Greek Cypriot prisoners. Finally, after the Vienna Agreement, those remaining persons who were enclaved in the south were allowed to go to the north in a facilitated migration in August 1975. By the end of 1975, all the Turkish Cypriots in the south had made their way to the north, leaving behind only 130 elderly Turkish Cypriots. The number of Turkish Cypriots displaced from the south was 48,000. However, apart from those displaced from the south in this period, there were another 12,000 Turkish Cypriots who had their homes in the south but had already been displaced in the 1963-64 period and were living in enclaves situated in the northern part of the island. Hence, the total number of displaced Turkish Cypriots originally from the south is almost 60,000.

Unlike in the case of Greek Cypriot resettlement, there were enough empty Greek Cypriot houses in the north to accommodate all the Turkish Cypriot persons displaced from the south. Despite this, there were particularly favoured areas, especially urban areas, and tensions arose over the distribution of housing in these places. The Turkish Cypriot administration made an effort to resettle villages as communities, but this was not always possible. For many years after the island’s division, there were disputes within the Turkish Cypriot community about the distribution of land during this period, and there were many claims that distribution was often made on the basis of favours or nepotism. Additionally, the arrival of settlers from Turkey between 1975 and 1979 increased tensions, as these settlers were immediately given affected Greek Cypriot properties such as agricultural land and a house.
2. POLITICAL POSITIONS AND POLICIES AFTER THE DIVISION

Shortly after the 1963 crisis the Turkish Cypriots set up their own provisional administration in the areas under their control. The Cyprus government, having by early 1964 become a solely Greek Cypriot administration, retained control everywhere in the Republic except the Turkish Cypriot enclaves. After the division of the island in 1974, the effective authority of the all-Greek Cypriot government of the RoC became restricted to the southern part of the island. In the north the Turkish Cypriots consolidated their own administration and in 1983 declared the establishment of the present Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), a state recognised only by Turkey.

Division has had far-reaching consequences as regards the ethno-demographic situation as well as Cypriots’ freedom to travel and settle throughout the island or exercise property rights. The island’s total population in 1974 was estimated at 641,000, of whom 506,000 (78.9%) were Greek Cypriots, 118,000 (18.4%) Turkish Cypriots and the rest were foreign residents (2.7%). In the wake of the division, about a quarter of the Greek Cypriot population, and roughly half of the Turkish Cypriot population were displaced. These population transfers rendered the two parts of the island in effect ethnically homogenised.

In the elapsed period of over three decades the displaced persons in both parts of the island have been accommodated and have largely adapted to their new environments (IDMC 2009). Without a political settlement of the wider Cyprus problem, however, claims related to lost homes and properties have generally remained unsettled until now. Since 1974, life on each side has evolved quite independently from the other and two separate Cypriot societies, each with its own state, economy and social and civil structures have come to exist. This situation has in turn led to further disputes between the two sides in addition to the ones arising from the population transfers of 1974-75. The most contentious of these disputes

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9 This administration has, since 1964, claimed to be – and has gradually come to be internationally accepted as – the legitimate government of the RoC, the only internationally recognised Cypriot state.

10 Since 1974 Turkey has kept around 35,000 troops on the island, the Turkish side’s claim being that this is needed for security reasons until an overall agreement is reached.

11 For 29 years after division travel between north and south was virtually impossible for Cypriots. This situation changed in April 2003 when the Turkish Cypriot authorities unilaterally decided to allow crossings through the border separating the Turkish Cypriot-controlled north and the Greek Cypriot-controlled south.
concerns migration from Turkey into the northern part of Cyprus. All these essentially human issues are interlocked with the political aspects of the question of division, and thus have not only remained unaddressed but have also become virtually intractable. On both sides of the island they are officially viewed as crucially connected with certain key elements of a Cyprus settlement, e.g., bizonality, political equality, the current political and legal status of the two Cypriot administrations and their political and legal relevance in the creation of any post-solution Cyprus state.

How to settle the ‘unresolved division of Cyprus’ – as it was described in a UN report (UN 2003: paragraph 107) – has been the focus of the UN-sponsored inter-communal negotiations that have continued intermittently and inconclusively for several decades. From about 1977 onwards, the ostensibly mutually accepted objective of the negotiations has been the island’s reunification on a bizonal basis. However, the incompatible ways in which each side interprets the meaning of ‘reunification’ and ‘bizonality’ may be seen in their approaches to the issues of territory, property, and the return of displaced persons. The Turkish Cypriot leadership has in the past insisted on a global exchange of property that would have meant that displaced Greek Cypriots would not return to the north. Beginning with the Annan Plan, Turkish Cypriot negotiators accepted the possibility of various remedies but insisted that return must be limited in order to ensure that Turkish Cypriots would remain a clear majority in their own constituent state. In contrast, Greek Cypriot leaderships have until recently insisted upon the right of return for displaced persons and their right to decide on their property. In practice, such a solution could potentially lead to a Greek Cypriot majority throughout the island, hence suggesting that the Greek Cypriot negotiating position on bizonality does not necessarily entail Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot majorities in the respective proposed zones.

These differing negotiating positions derive from contrasting interpretations of the causes of the conflict, as well as each side’s own feelings of victimisation. While Turkish Cypriots have tended to date the beginning of the conflict to the Emergency Years of the 1950s and have emphasised their own hardships and victimisation in the 1963-74 period, Greek Cypriots have tended to date the beginning of the Cyprus Problem to 1974, and see its causes in Turkey’s military intervention and forcible division of the island. These differing interpretations of the causes of the conflict have led to contrasting policies following the island’s division that have, in their turn, left lasting legacies that both shape the present and influence possibilities for reconciliation.

Because of Turkish Cypriot security fears, the general position has been that any resolution of the island’s division will be one in which Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots live side by side rather than together. Thus, since 1974, on the Turkish Cypriot side it has generally been presumed that the two communities’ separation is permanent and that each community should organise its own internal structure in its own area. The assumption that any solution would entail a global exchange of property formed the basis of the official policy followed in the resettlement of Turkish Cypriots displaced from the south. The same principle determined the Turkish Cypriot administration’s approach to Greek Cypriot properties in the north.
The process of building a new social and economic environment in the north where the Turkish Cypriots would all live together relied very much on the properties left empty after the departure of Greek Cypriots. A series of unilateral – i.e., without any agreement with the Greek Cypriot side – measures and laws were adopted in order to facilitate that process. The purpose of the stipulated arrangements was described as ‘distribution of resources for rehabilitation’ of relevant sections of the population ‘in accordance with principles of social justice and in a viable way ensuring productivity and economic development’ (TRNC 1977: section 2). Thus Greek Cypriot properties were allocated – initially only for use but later also for possession – to (a) ‘refugees’ who included Turkish Cypriots displaced from the south, repatriated pre-1974 Turkish Cypriot emigrants, and – until 1982 – those immigrants (in practice from Turkey) who were officially judged as needed for development of northern Cyprus and granted citizenship of the Turkish Cypriot state; (b) victims of the conflict; (c) Turkish Cypriot resistance fighters (or mudjahids); (d) those Turkish soldiers who fought in the 1974 war and afterwards settled and became citizens; and (d) Turkish Cypriots with insufficient income.

One important feature of the allocation procedures was the notion of ‘equivalent property’. This concerned granting to persons who left property in the south, or whose property in the north was destroyed in the conflict, the possession of ‘abandoned’ Greek Cypriot property of equal value. For this purpose, a general property evaluation and exchange system was introduced with the value unit of a ‘point’. In this system, Turkish Cypriot properties in the south and Greek Cypriot properties in the north were valued in terms of points. Based on these values Turkish Cypriot owners of properties in the south were assigned points in exchange for submitting their title-deeds to the Turkish Cypriot government. After this, an owner could exchange his/her points for a Greek Cypriot property of equal point value located in the north. Points could also be traded, donated as a gift or inherited. The Turkish Cypriot government also issued points as compensation to various categories of persons, such as victims of the conflict or those who served in the Turkish Cypriot resistance struggle including the 1974 war. These points could then be exchanged for possession of Greek Cypriot property of equal point value. In addition, persons with insufficient income and Turkish immigrants who settled before 1982 could buy points from the Turkish Cypriot government enabling them to receive possession of Greek Cypriot property. Between 1982 and 1995, people were issued an official document called a ‘definitive possessory certificate’ (kesin tasarruf belgesi) for Greek Cypriot property received in exchange for points, which gave them the right to transfer or mortgage the property. After 1995, these certificates came to be regarded as ‘immovable property title-deeds’.

12 In the process, individual owners were required to sign a document, called feragatname (certificate of renunciation), as proof of their agreement that they relinquished their rights to properties in the south in favour of the Turkish Cypriot state.
In this way, ‘abandoned’ Greek Cypriot properties gradually became part of the social and economic fabric in the north. Since 1974, such property has been the subject of significant dealings by Turkish Cypriots and foreigners at an increasing rate. Within the framework of the Turkish Cypriot regime, most Greek Cypriot property is now under new ownership (private or public) and can be inherited, mortgaged, traded, sold (including sale to foreigners), and developed for private or public use.

The Greek Cypriot approach to separation and displaced persons has been completely contrary to all this. Because Greek Cypriot official discourse has interpreted the conflict as beginning in 1974 and has seen the previous period as one of ‘peaceful coexistence’ between the two communities, there has been a tendency to see the Cyprus Problem as one of Turkey’s continuing military presence in the island. Moreover, immigration into the north since 1974, particularly from Turkey, has been seen to be part of a systematic policy of colonising the occupied part of Cyprus. It has been alleged that this policy aims at distorting the ‘population balance’ between the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots in order to justify the Turkish Cypriot claims regarding bizonality and political equality. Indeed, for most Greek Cypriots reunification of Cyprus is inconceivable without the reversal of what they see as the two most important ‘illegal Turkish faits accomplis’; one is the appropriation of Greek Cypriot properties and the other the demographic changes brought about by transfer of population from Turkey.

The Greek Cypriot side considers that all Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot properties still belong to the original, i.e., pre-1974, owners. And the Greek Cypriot side also demands that any settlement agreement must ensure the application throughout the island of freedoms of movement and settlement and right to property, including recognition of all displaced persons’ rights to their homes and properties. In the meantime, under the measures adopted by the Greek Cypriot government, the interior minister is appointed as ‘custodian’ of all Turkish Cypriot property in the south (RoC 1991). The custodian’s function is to manage and allocate such property in a way that is compatible with serving the needs of the refugees, parallel to serving

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13 Until about 1980, the settlement of Turkish nationals was indeed encouraged and facilitated in a joint effort by the Turkish Cypriot authorities and the Turkish government. Immigrants arriving under this policy were allocated Greek Cypriot property (as mentioned above) and citizenship right away. The idea was to prop-up the Turkish population and help create a viable economy in the north. About 20,000 Turkish nationals took up that call at the time – the group of immigrants that can sensibly be described as ‘settlers’ given the scheme under which they were brought to Cyprus. However, because of internal discontent and, not least, international pressure stirred by Greek Cypriot protests, privileges in the form of offering properties and automatic granting of citizenship were stopped in the early 1980s and the policy faded away. Still, Turkish immigrants continued coming to northern Cyprus of their own initiative, mostly as economic migrants, with some going on to acquire citizenship. From 2004 onwards, serious effort has been made by the Turkish Cypriot government to put in place measures regulating both immigration and acquisition of TRNC citizenship. For detailed analyses on this topic, see Hatay (2005) and Hatay (2007).

14 Generally Greek Cypriots worry that not only will they be prevented from returning to the north but, ‘due to the colonisation of northern Cyprus by settlers from Turkey, the Greek Cypriots will be gradually squeezed out of Cyprus.’ See Greek Cypriot Proposals, 1989, accessible at http://www.moi.gov.cy/mai/pio/pio.nsf/0/1CF2A298C8CB6C5CEC2256D6D00344433/$file/Proposals%201989.pdf.
the interests of the owners of the properties in question. Most Turkish Cypriot properties have thus been leased to Greek Cypriot displaced persons (at a rate lower than the market rent) or to the government, local authorities and organisations working for public benefit (at market rate). Legislation also provides for compulsory acquisition and compulsory distribution or sale of Turkish Cypriot property under certain conditions. Though transfer of title to another person is explicitly ruled out, such action is exceptionally allowed if deemed beneficial for the owner or necessary in the public interest.

However, notwithstanding the Greek Cypriot side’s apparent stance in defence of full respect for all displaced persons’ property rights, the actual practice in the south generally prevents Turkish Cypriots from reclaiming theirs – including receiving compensation or any other payment due to them in relation to their properties – until after a comprehensive settlement. In the meantime, the government has allowed a lot of Turkish Cypriot property to be modified through ‘development and productive use’ – both for private and public purposes, the latter including building refugee housing estates and various forms of infrastructure – which is likely to make full restitution in the future of such property impossible.

In order to deal with the consequences of displacement and substantially worsened socioeconomic conditions in the wake of the 1974 division, the government in the Greek Cypriot-controlled south implemented a series of policies and measures. Among these were incentives (provision of state land, preferential loans, etc.) offered to displaced business people to help reactivate this section of the society. At the same time, state-led development projects aimed at creating employment were put into operation in the sectors of tourism, light industry and agriculture in districts where displaced persons were settled.

For addressing the needs of displaced persons, the Service for the Care and Rehabilitation of Displaced Persons (SCRDP) was established on 18 August 1974. The SCRDP’s initially more broadly defined task of assisting and supporting displaced persons was over time limited to managing the provision of housing aid in various forms:

15 Until 2010, only Turkish Cypriot property owners who lived in the south or moved abroad before 1974 could claim their property. In 2010 The 1991 Turkish Cypriot Properties Law was amended extending this right to include those who went abroad after 1974. The amendment establishes the right of Turkish Cypriot property owners to have recourse to the district courts in case of alleged violation of their right guaranteed by the European Convention on Human Rights or its Protocols, but only after their claim has been rejected by the Minister of Interior. If the court finds a violation, compensation or restitution of property may be granted. In exceptional cases, there is a possibility of lifting the custodianship over a particular property. This amendment was triggered by a case which a Turkish Cypriot who left Cyprus after 1974 lodged at the ECHR alleging violation of her property rights by the RoC (ECHR 2010).

16 According to Matis (2011), in 1974 the Greek Cypriot economic activity was reduced by one-third; unemployment was as high as 30%; and there was heavy loss of productive resources as well as social and economic infrastructure.

17 For a more detailed account of such mechanisms to help displaced persons, see Trimikliniotis and Demetriou (2012).

- financial aid for self-help housing on private land/repair of residence;
- financial aid for purchase of apartment/house;
- financial aid for self-help housing on government-allocated land; and
- low-cost government housing estates.

As mentioned above, properties left behind by the Turkish Cypriots who moved to the north were also used in housing Greek Cypriot displaced persons. However, the Turkish Cypriot houses that were situated in the mountains and other rural areas were in less demand by Greek Cypriot displaced persons, and most of these remained unoccupied and untended, many falling into ruin.

Displaced persons are provided with ‘refugee identity cards’ that make them eligible for various government schemes to support persons affected by displacement. Persons who are regarded as displaced are those who in 1974 were resident in the now Turkish Cypriot-controlled northern part of Cyprus and their descendants.19

Another institution created in the south to address problems arising from loss of access to properties in the north is the Central Agency for Equal Distribution of Burdens. The agency’s task is to manage a ‘scheme for the restoration of the pre-war solvency of the owners whose immovable property in Cyprus is in the areas occupied by the Turkish occupation forces and in the areas that are inaccessible due to the Turkish occupation forces’, which involves granting loans (for housing, business, medical treatment, to newlywed couples, to associations) and guarantees (for business and housing loans).20

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19 Until a recent change in the law, only those children whose fathers hold a refugee identity card were issued with such cards. In 2011, children whose mothers hold a refugee identity card also became eligible.

3. RECOURSE TO THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS

Pending a resolution within the context of a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem, the issue of displaced persons’ property-related claims have been the subject of many cases at the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR or the Court). Most of these are Greek Cypriot applications against Turkey, all lodged by individuals except the interstate case of Cyprus v. Turkey. Others are applications against the RoC by Turkish Cypriot individuals, generally dating from 2004 and much fewer in number compared to the Greek Cypriot cases. The only Turkish Cypriot case that has been concluded so far, the case of Sofi v. Cyprus, ended in a friendly settlement (see footnote 21).

As regards Greek Cypriot applications against Turkey, the ECtHR has issued numerous decisions since 1996. In those prior to the Court’s 2010 decision in Demopoulos v. Turkey and 7 other cases, it was established that (a) Greek Cypriots displaced from northern Cyprus remain the legal owners of the property they left behind; and (b) Turkey is responsible for violations of the right to property as well as the right to respect for the home arising from the arbitrary denial of access by owners to such property. Also, because neither the Turkish nor the Turkish Cypriot authorities had established a credible remedy for these violations, compensation was ordered by the Court in favour of affected individual applicants for loss of use of their property. Consequently, the validity of the Turkish Cypriot measures and legislation concerning Greek Cypriot properties and their assignment to Turkish Cypriots was not only called into question internationally but also by many people within the Turkish Cypriot society.

With hundreds of more similar Greek Cypriot cases pending, in 2005 the Court started to apply its ‘pilot judgement procedure’ for repetitive cases. This began in the case of Xenides-Arestis v. Turkey, when Turkey was ordered to introduce a generally applicable remedy ‘which

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21 The cases are all against Turkey because it has its troops in the northern part of the island and because the TRNC is not internationally recognized and hence not a signatory to the European Convention on Human Rights.

22 The landmark decisions are Loizidou v. Turkey (ECtHR 1996), Cyprus v. Turkey (ECtHR 2001), Xenides-Arestis v. Turkey (ECtHR 2005), and Demopoulos v. Turkey and 7 other cases (ECtHR 2010).

23 Under the European Convention on Human Rights, the right to property and the right to respect for the home are protected under Article 1 of Protocol 1 to the Convention (protection of property) and Article 8 of the Convention (right to respect for privacy, including in the home), respectively.
In response, the TRNC passed legislation establishing an ‘Immovable Property Commission’ (IPC), authorized to provide remedies to Greek Cypriot owners of property in northern Cyprus (TRNC 2005). In its *Demopoulos* decision in 2010 the Court found that the IPC constitutes an effective domestic remedy. As a result, Greek Cypriot complaints regarding violations of the right to property and the right to respect for the home under the Convention are no longer heard by the Court unless the claimant has first sought redress through the IPC.

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24 The remedies are restitution of property in a limited category of situations, exchange of property with a Turkish Cypriot property in the south, and compensation for the value of property.
4. PEOPLE’S PERCEPTIONS

In our field research, we employed focus groups (FGs) in order to have an understanding of the current views, sensitivities, expectations and hopes of displaced Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. FGs were conducted in four separate locations in each case: Nicosia, Larnaca, Pafos and Limassol for Greek Cypriots; Morphou, Kyrenia, Nicosia and Famagusta-Karpas for Turkish Cypriots. Participants included people from different generations, most of whom were displaced in 1963 or 1974 or both, with the rest having parents who were displaced. The focus groups discussed the impact of the partial opening of borders in April 2003 on ideas about reunification and return, favoured remedies for settlement of outstanding property claims (restitution, compensation, exchange), prospects of a solution, and views on the negotiations.25

When the check-points were opened in 2003 allowing people to cross the Green Line and visit the other side, most displaced persons, Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots alike, went back to look at their homes and properties for the first time in about three decades. Although there was an initial moment of euphoria, many also encountered a reality for which they were not prepared: that of someone else living in their home and using their property, often unwilling to leave, and laying claims on the property in terms that many owners may not have been prepared for.

4.1 GREEK CYPRIOTS

For the Greek Cypriot displaced, given their long-nurtured memories of the past and hopes of return, this has been a highly emotional experience but at the same time one that might be described as having a sobering, reality-check effect. As expressed by one FG participant:

‘We remembered a mountain, and when we went back, we found a hill.’

The impression of another participant was recounted like this:

‘The first time I went back I felt beaten. Too much has happened; there has been too much development and resettlement. It’s over. There are street signs in Turkish, there are

25 Summaries according to area of both Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot FGs can be found at http://www.prio-cyprus-displacement.net/default.asp?id=648.
restaurants operating, there are hotels, there is a way of life here, and how can we just throw them out of their lives? That would be doing to them what they did to us.’

For someone who only had a pre-1974 memory of his original habitat, seeing how things have been transformed was inevitably depressing:

‘My grandfather aged in front of my eyes when he went back to his house in Lapithos. When he saw the way Lapithos was today compared to how it was, it killed him. He remembers it with little cottage-like houses, running streams, a pretty place. Today there is mass development, apartments, [while] churches and the older buildings are rotting away. It was like a big layer of dust had settled on the place. It destroyed him and he hasn’t been back.’

Quite a few of the participants related positive impressions of their encounter with the current Turkish Cypriot occupants of their houses who were generally welcoming:

‘In the face of their politeness, you feel shocked. I went expecting war, you know, expecting that there would be problems, and they were so welcoming. At that point you start thinking, “ok, my family are refugees, but so is this [Turkish Cypriot] family,” So there are two sides of the coin.’

‘I haven’t heard about a Greek Cypriot refugee who went back to their house where a Turkish Cypriot refugee was living and who had a bad impression or experience.’

Some participants said they were uncomfortable when they crossed over to the north, and there were others who had never crossed:

‘I haven’t yet been back. I cannot. My house is in barbed wire. I think I’ll have a heart attack if I go back to see it. They don’t let you go into that area. I prefer to keep it as I remember it, and I don’t want to go.’

‘There is no reason for me to go. What am I going to do? Go over there, cry, and return? The only reason I would go is to take my son, so that I can transmit that feeling of home to him.’

The opening of the check-points was the most important factor in altering people’s perspectives on the likelihood and desirability of return. Seeing the other side, visiting pre-1974 homes and neighbourhoods made many people less keen to return. In many cases, hopes and expectations of return were replaced by a sad realization that it may never happen:

‘The first time I went over I realised we are never going back, and I accepted that. Compensation is important though.’

‘Before I went back I thought everyone would be able to go back. Once I went back, I realised that would never happen.’

‘The person living in my house was a refugee. He told me that one of his children was born in the same hospital in Lemessos where my daughter was born. That man has a family, he
has children who were raised in that house. I lived four years in my house. They have lived thirty years in that house. They were raised there, they married there, they have families there and grandchildren. Situations have changed. I don’t feel that they are the enemy. They also had to leave, they also lived nightmares. Their children are not to blame, just like our children are not to blame. Their roots are there now, and the point is where do you take those people? Why? They have rights too.’

A point that was common in all the Greek Cypriot FGs was that the more times people went over, the less emotional they became about returning, but the more frustrated they grew with the lack of a solution of the Cyprus problem.

‘I don’t cross as much as I used to. I feel no attachment to the place. In the first years that the check-points opened, I went three times, four times a week, but now . . . I feel there is no reason for me to go.’

‘My perspective is more positive. I know what is on the other side, I know the people, I know what to expect. The opening of the check-points made me more comfortable with the idea of unification.’

‘The insane nature of the negotiations, the arrogance of the negotiators, four decades of talking about nothing makes me so angry. I go over there [north] and I see how life has gone on, and I get so angry at the Greek Cypriots – they have this attitude that it’s everything or nothing, and I really think we’re going to get nothing in the end. We don’t know the word compromise. I also get frustrated with the Turkish Cypriots; because there are some things they can do to give the Greek Cypriots confidence. Yes, you suffered in the 50s, 60s and 70s, but we suffered too . . . Turkish Cypriots have had their “reward” for their suffering, which is their own state and land, etc., but Greek Cypriots haven’t been “rewarded” for their suffering. And Turkish Cypriots need to be sensitive to that.’

Growing pessimism about the peace process combined with the experience of seeing the north seems to have influenced people’s notion of where their ‘home’ is:

[Until recently] home for me was Varossi [Varosha], but now it’s Larnaca because I decided to accept that we’d never have a solution.’

Yet for others return was still important and longed for:

‘I felt that I wanted my house back. I felt sorrow. We were raised in that house.’

‘It’s fine here in the refugee village, but we’re still waiting to see if we can return. We’re always waiting, even if it’s not realistic. You can’t forget your home.’

‘How can we feel that our home is here when we live in Turkish houses?’
A commonly expressed idea was that after all this time moving back was no longer simple.

‘I feel that I am a Varosiotis,26 but if you live in another city for 20 years, regardless of the reason you move there, war or no war, you don’t get up and move back so easily. You have your circle, you have your schools, your children, your work, your life. I could go and live in Varossi, but it would be a huge process before that could happen.’

‘My wife and I want to go back if we have the choice. But we understand that this would be a very complicated thing, and it would not be like the past. We know that. But that place is home for us.’

‘It’s impossible for us to return. Our lives are here now. The problems that we will face will be different. How will I go and live alone in Varossi?’

‘You get used to living here and you don’t want to leave. We’ve had kids. The kids don’t know their house or their village. Not many would go back, especially the youth; maybe those who had lots of land. If ten more years pass, it’s all finished. Who will go back?’

As for conditions required in order to return, for almost all participants being under Greek Cypriot administration was a requirement. They said that they didn’t feel safe under Turkish Cypriot administration. Some talked about the local police force being Greek Cypriot. Another condition was the withdrawal of the Turkish Army.

When it came to choosing a remedy in the context of a possible property claims settlement, the order of preference was almost always restitution first, then compensation, and lastly exchange. However, whether property would be under Greek Cypriot or Turkish Cypriot administration was mentioned as an important factor in making such a decision. If the property were to be under Turkish Cypriot administration most said they would opt for compensation.

Serious concern was expressed about the complexity of implementation of the exchange option. Another concern was about how connections were important in Cyprus, and hence there was the risk of things not being done fairly. Although some regarded compensation as a ‘logical solution’, an important reason for hesitation about it was related to its amount. A constantly reoccurring point was that the amount of compensation needed to be at a fair level, comparing to market values.

It was commonly felt that the second generation (in displaced families) would take compensation because they had no connection to the place but this was contradicted by a second-generation participant:

‘I would not be satisfied with compensation. I am second generation, but the right for my parents to be able to live in their home again is important to me. It’s vital to me.’

26 Someone who comes from the town of Varosha.
When discussing prospects of a solution, some talked about building it in steps. One view was to start with a confederation with a clear road map of that gradually developing towards a federation based on everything working all right along the way. Another was a suggestion to start with a few ministries at the federal level to help build trust that would in turn facilitate the creation of further joint ministries.

A more cynical proposal was:

‘What we live now is the solution. Partition is the way; it will stay.’

One participant brought up the issue of territory:

‘[Turkish Cypriots] should offer a degree of land return, to make it easier for us as a community to say yes to the plan.’

A number of people made the point that they would sacrifice their properties for the sake of unification and peace and also that it was only fair that people be compensated for what they lost:

‘While we have this dividing line and no solution, I feel like we’ve sold half of Cyprus. But I know that a number of people will not get their houses or their land back, this is reality. But it doesn’t stop me from supporting a solution.’

‘We have to accept that not all refugees will go back. It might be me going back, it might not be, but we all have to accept that for the sake of the future, only some of us will return.’

‘I knew from the beginning that we would not all be returning. The important thing is not whether I go back or not, I can sacrifice return – but the important thing is that we have a workable solution that is safe for everyone, where Turkish and Greek Cypriots can live in the state and feel that we have a future, and I can choose a place that I can live and build a life. But at the same time, I think it would be just for those who lost to be compensated in that context.’

But there was also the point that some losses were impossible to compensate:

‘When we were 18 or 19 and we were just opening our wings to fly, and we had a whole life ahead of us in a city that was so developed, so beautiful, where we had no idea that this was going to happen, it came, it threw our lives in the air and our lives were stolen because all of a sudden we inherited this weight, this enormous weight of “Is it going to be solved? Is it not going to be solved? What is going to happen? Are we going to go back? Are we going to live those lives again?” I don’t stop imaging that I’m going back to my house and I think “How will I go? Which road shall I take? Will I find the roads again, after all these years? How will my house be?” And I see this dream over and over and over and I wake up, and to bring my mind back to the present much time passes, and I feel this deep bitterness because I think “How is it possible that they haven’t found a solution in all of these years to the problem so that each person can go home, so that everyone, Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots, can feel like this is resolved?” No compensation and no solution can give us this
back. I want a solution. I am prepared to compromise and to share and to not have everything that we want in order to come to a resolution of this problem, but no one can give me back what I lost.’

A sentiment that stood out and cut across all the FGs was extreme disappointment with and scepticism – if not cynicism – about the ongoing inter-communal negotiations for resolving the Cyprus problem. Participants overwhelmingly talked about being tired of the conflict’s existence, of constantly thinking about the problem, of hoping . . . They said they did not feel like engaging any more in the peace process.

‘Why 37 years? Why so many years to solve this problem? Have they been necessary? It should have been solved in the first years. We lost our whole lives here, waiting, waiting, being told that we would go back soon.’

A common complaint about the negotiations was that the ‘information black-out’ was disturbing: what was happening in effect was that a group of elites were discussing the future of the island on people’s behalf, but without any consultation. That there needed to be more communication between the negotiating teams and the public – especially the refugees – was constantly reiterated. True, there were representatives of refugee organisations, but going through them wasn’t the best way, as they did not necessarily represent refugee interests but rather certain political lines:

‘We cannot get past the political background of the representative, so what we want is never really heard.’

‘They need to get people’s opinions; it’s not a political or party issue. They need to consider the national interest objectively, everyone’s perspective.’

‘Where are they getting their feedback from at the moment? From the parties, from the organisations, and from the parliamentarians. The parliamentarians belong to the parties, the organisations belong to the parties. So ultimately they take the opinions and the perspectives of the parties. There is no independence of opinion. We are not independent. We need to put political interests and the right/left division aside so that we can solve this problem [the Cyprus conflict].’

Given the highly technical aspect of the property issue, the need was also expressed for explanation as to how it would be resolved, and for a clear description of how a settlement based on compensation/restitution/exchange would work and what each option means. One participant even suggested:

‘If you put real estate agents to sort out the property issue instead of lawyers, we’d have the problem solved easily.’
The importance of ensuring that the public was prepared for a solution was conveyed thus:

‘We all need to be prepared for any solution. The political leadership needs to explain the plan to us, in advance, so we’re ready for it. They need to start now. And we need to learn to live together in steps, slowly. It can’t happen all at once. [We need] to increase co-operation between the communities, to increase dialogue. But it needs to be done carefully, with sensitivity to both sides and with an overarching plan, not in the chaotic way in which it occasionally happens now.’

4.2 TURKISH CYPRIOTS

Unlike the Greek Cypriot case, the Turkish Cypriot displaced persons were resettled in the north with a view that they had arrived at their final destination; that there was no going back. This was a generally shared perception in the Turkish Cypriot FGs where most of the participants spoke about their displacement in 1974 as in effect being the inevitable consequence of the events in the 1950s and 1960s.

‘Looking at it from a humane point of view, I wished we could live together with Greek Cypriots as brothers and sisters. But the truth is Turks and Greeks are like fire and gunpowder which, when kept apart, pose no danger but explosion occurs when they are brought together. Because of mistakes made by both sides, there are ill-feelings between the two communities which seem ineradicable for the time being. Generations need to pass for these to be forgotten.’

‘When we were about to be released from the prison camp, a Greek Cypriot officer accompanied by a UN officer asked us where we wanted to go: Turkey [sic] or our village? Of course at that time our nationalist feelings ran high and the answer was Turkey. We were very emotional when we came to the north, hugging the Turkish soldiers we encountered. It was the end of a great longing. I was so moved I cried on hearing the sound of ezan [call for prayer] issuing from Nicosia’s mosques early in the first morning after we arrived.’

‘Everything started because of the Greek Cypriots’ dream of joining the island with Greece. This eventually led to 1974 and we all had to move from our homes.’

‘There was an exchange of populations, it was only normal that this should be followed by an exchange of properties. How else were people going to carry on with their lives?’

Nonetheless, a few other participants related their experience of displacement differently:

‘When we left our homes [in 1974], we were expecting to be back. Most of us [from our village] thought that way. For months we lived out of our suitcases, not settling down.’

‘In 1974 there was an organized effort to make people believe that they wouldn’t be safe in their village and that therefore they should leave. And most of us left believing that
we'd be back after a while. Other places may be different but this is how it was in the case of my village [Kalkanlı/Arodes (Pafos)]. My father, approaching 90, is still hoping that. He is energized when he visits his village [in the south]. He still feels like a refugee; I do too. I still feel myself a refugee. I've built nothing here. The house in which I live doesn't belong to me. Should Morphou be given to Greek Cypriots, I would want to go back to the place from where I came here.'

'My father kept hoping that he'd be able to go back. But he died before the check-points opened.'

Almost all the participants said they visited their pre-1974 places upon the opening of the check-points in 2003. Only one, who was displaced from his village in 1963, apparently didn't:

'I haven't been back since 1974. Before that, for eleven years I couldn't go back to my village which is destroyed. I can't even find my father's grave. I have no reason to go there. Anyway, some fanatic may say something that irritates me and gets me into trouble.'

In the case of those who did, some regarded their experience as confirming that going back was not a realistic option:

'After 2003, I went to see my house which, in my case, isn't in bad shape. Memories of my life there didn't come alive much because the house now is just a building. I wasn't moved all that much. Because it was so many years ago, I have got used to here because I have had a longer part of my life here. I wouldn't want to go back even if they gave me all my property back. We are all right on this side.'

'Seeing my destroyed home and village made me realize that return is impossible, either for us or for the Greeks:'

'I went back to my village hoping to meet the place that has remained with me in my dreams. But the place had changed so much that I couldn't even locate my own land. I also discovered that refugee houses had been built on rather fertile lands that were Turkish Cypriot-owned. It seemed to me as if they did this to prevent our return.'

'I went back to Pafos to visit. It didn't mean much to me. But I showed the property I, or rather my family, left there to my children one of whom simply said: “Sell it and buy me a car!” When I told him I couldn’t, he laughed and said: “Why do you say it is yours then?”'

Quite a few of the participants expressed pessimism about the viability of bringing the two communities together again. They supported this view with accounts of incidents during their visits to the south arising from emotional and/or hostile attitudes of some Greek Cypriots. Admittedly caused by a minority of individuals, and often with other Greek Cypriots coming forward to help to calm things down, these were described as examples of situations which were reminders of how difficult and problematic it could be for Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots to live mixed together.
‘I don’t feel entirely safe when I go to the other side. I worry that there may be trouble from some fanatics. Remember what happened following a football match; or how Greek Cypriot youths beat up some Turks in Troodos. Even though these are a minority among a majority of sensible people, they can bash your car or your head just because you are Turkish.’

‘We cannot live together with Greek Cypriots. We can do business together, eat and drink together but there should be a border between us; our homes must be separate. I don’t trust them for my safety.’

‘They can come and live on our side as long as they remain a minority.’

One participant objected to this view relating apparently positive impressions of the interaction in the 1960s between the people of his own – entirely Turkish Cypriot populated – village and their Greek Cypriot neighbours:

‘I disagree with the view that we can’t live together with the Greek Cypriots. There was no Greek Cypriot attack on our village [Mandria/Yeşilova (Pafos)] between 1963 and 1974. There were no Greek Cypriots in our village – they had escaped in 1958. There were a few incidents provoked by our side, Turkish Cypriots, but these were always resolved through diplomatic intervention . . . The biggest problem at the time were the Turkish officers who would, for example, prevent us from selling our agricultural produce to Greek Cypriots.’

There were several stories of encounters between current and former occupants of houses leading to friendships:

‘There were pictures of saints on the walls and other pictures made by the woman herself. We didn’t touch any of these. When the former inhabitants of the house came and saw [all that] the wife cried. We told her not to cry, and that they could come anytime they wanted to this place which was their home too, etc. What could one say? We told them that we left properties in Mandria and we couldn’t go there now. So this was what we were given here instead. They were surprised to hear that we came to the north because Greek Cypriots attacked our village. Most Greek Cypriots have no idea that during the [landing in Cyprus of the Turkish army], Greek Cypriots attacked Turkish Cypriot villages.’

‘We became friends with the former owners of our house here, and visited each other. They never mentioned anything about wanting to have their properties back.’

Other impressions concerned the unease some current occupants felt because of visits of former occupants:

‘When the Greek Cypriot owners of our house visited after the opening of the borders in 2003, my mother was worried and exclaimed: ‘I have been living in the house for 30 years. How can I be expected to give it back?’ She calmed down and sympathized when I asked her to think what she would have wanted to do if she were in their place. Later when the Greek Cypriots owners came back again we told them that the house was theirs and they could have it back whenever they wanted.’
‘During the first visit of the Greek Cypriot owners of our house, we were pleasant to them. But when they came again later my wife wasn’t all that welcoming. She didn’t offer them even a drink while they went looking around the house, including the bedrooms as if they were in their own home. When I asked my wife why she was so inhospitable, her reply was that she couldn’t understand why they kept coming back, and was irritated by that as a sign of lack of respect for the fact that the house had been our home for more than 30 years.

Among the three possible ways of dealing with outstanding property claims, the majority in all FGs expressed preference for options that excluded return to property, i.e., either exchange or compensation. There were only a few participants who wanted their property to be given back to them or who would consider return (albeit communally):

‘I and my family, we never signed a contract handing over our property [in the south] to [the Turkish Cypriot government]. I would never exchange my property there for anything here. For me my own property is priceless. In a solution I want to get my property back. I will give back any property I am using here back to its owner. People, if they want, should have their properties back.’

‘I would return if I got my property back but not alone, not without community.’

‘I would go to live in my village if the whole village returned and if a house were built for me as our original village [1963] is destroyed.’

Many of those favouring exchange or compensation expressed reservations about the way in which Greek Cypriot properties had been distributed in the north which, they believed, made the property issue harder to solve. These included the following:

- Property valuations (made in terms of ‘points’) and equivalent property comparisons based on these valuations were flawed because they were not based on proper data but rather on a system impaired by arbitrary categorisations, witness testimonies and not infrequently biased/unprincipled/nepotistic official decisions. This complaint was especially marked in the Morphou and Karpas FGs, where quite a few of the participants insisted that the properties they left in the south were worth a lot more, especially in the present market, than the properties they have been given in the north in exchange. Thus they feel that, should they be relocated from their present area as part of a solution, then they should be rehabilitated and compensated on the basis of what they left in the south not, what they would vacate in the present area.

- Granting Greek Cypriot property to persons who left no property in the south or to Turkish nationals arriving through facilitated immigration [roughly during 1975-1980] was a

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27 This happened through the government’s expansion of the points system (a) by way of issuing points not backed by any real asset which were then either distributed as compensation (e.g., compensation awarded for years of participation in the national struggle as mudjahids [Turkish Cypriot fighters], termed ‘mudjahid points’) or sold to ‘entitled individuals’ at a nominal rate; and (b) by way of allowing transfer of ownership of points between individuals on the free market.
big mistake because it opened the way to unfair enrichment of persons originally
without property while at the same time many displaced and dispossessed persons
were still awaiting to be adequately compensated for their loss of property.

However, notwithstanding the various misgivings about the implementation of the equiva-
 lent property exchange between individuals and the government (i.e., individuals accepting
transfer of own rights to property left in the south to the TRNC government in exchange for
TRNC-issued title-deeds for Greek Cypriot property) (these were described as ‘internal
problems’), many participants said they accepted this exchange as given, and trusted the
Turkish Cypriot government to resolve the outstanding issues by negotiating with the Greek
Cypriot side.

‘[It is not] up to us [individuals] to do the exchange. We have done the exchange already
[that is to say with the government, relinquishing (feragat) to the government the property
in the south in return for being granted Greek Cypriot property]. This is an issue for the
governments to resolve. I trust the TRNC government to talk and agree on these matters
with the Greek side.’

‘Property we were given here in exchange for our property in the south which we handed
over to the [Turkish Cypriot] government is now worth a fraction of the latter. This is not
good for me but the deal was done in the past and we can’t really question that now. It’s
up to the governments to resolve these issues.’

‘No question of going back even though we left property there. We would like to exchange
our properties. I never thought about selling them [to someone from the south outside
the arrangements that our government have put in place].’

‘We left properties and they gave us something against those but certainly not matching
in value what we left. But still, there’s no going back and I don’t believe any Turkish Cypriot
would want that.’

‘If we get our property back, wouldn’t bizonality vanish? How are we going to go back? What
shall we do with our property? I don’t want such a situation. Return to property would turn
everything upside down again. I wouldn’t return even if they paid me in addition to rein-
stating all my property.’

‘Our title deeds are now with our government which gave us title deeds for properties
here. It’s up to them to make the exchange and settle the balance.’

‘There was an exchange of populations with the consent of the leaders and the international
community. In the same way let’s have compensation of properties. But at this stage, return
and life together with Greek Cypriots is not possible.’

In discussion about prospects of a solution, the view shared by most was that it should be a
bizonal federation where property claims would be resolved based largely on exchange and
compensation, though for some the latter should be based on fresh valuations by independent and competent experts for both Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot properties. One recurring theme was how the present reality needed to be the basis of a solution:

‘I don’t believe there can be any going back after 37 years. We have settled and are rooted here now. I was single when we first came here. I got married, had children; my children got married, bought property, set up home, had children . . . Their jobs are here. A solution should be based on the present situation.’

‘Too much time has elapsed with the two communities living, developing, generally evolving separately. So I think it will be difficult for the two communities to live together again. Therefore a bizonal solution is the answer, like in the Annan Plan.’

‘In the beginning we didn’t know we were here to stay. Later in the 1980s when we [almost everybody except a very small percentage of people] submitted the title-deeds [to properties in the south] to the government, it became clear to us that there was no going back. Life moved on and people settled in and started regarding the properties they were given here as belonging to them. If we were to become emotional about the places we left behind, I am the most emotional one: I saw my village crying. Can a village cry? There, I saw it. When we were being brought back from the prison camp, we passed by our village, and I saw barley spikes in the fields crying. But we should avoid being emotional, and consider the realities. And the realities are: we can’t live together with the Greek Cypriots. They also accept this and so does the rest of the world. This is why everybody is talking about a federal solution. As for the properties, for me property belongs to the person using it. Whoever has suffered losses should be compensated through a commission in a fair and just way.’

A few people, who were critical of this approach, were of the opinion that the ECHR decisions ruled out the kind of exchange and compensation scheme that was being proposed by the Turkish Cypriot side.

As regards the negotiations, their lack of transparency was cause for concern with some people as it was in the Greek Cypriot case:

‘Property negotiations need to be transparent. They talk about Morphou, but tell us nothing. I don’t trust the outcome of such a process. There will be trouble in the end.’

Also some issues were raised that were thought to be relevant as regards the implementation of a negotiated solution:

‘Suppose a bizonal solution is reached. How are we going to settle accounts internally? Whereas we, the refugees, still haven’t recovered our losses, some people who had nothing received a lot of property, then built on it and increased its value even more. Will such people pay anything?’
‘In case of a solution, the important question is “who will do the valuations?” I trust neither Turkish nor Greek Cypriot politicians. I don’t trust anybody. It’s always the individual who loses.’

‘We gave a lot of property and received little in return. We still have lots of points\textsuperscript{28} against which we received nothing. What will happen to those? Are the properties associated with those points mine or does the [TRNC] own them?’

\textsuperscript{28} ‘Point’ refers to the value unit that was introduced by the Turkish Cypriot government as a measure of value for Turkish Cypriot properties in the south and Greek Cypriot properties in the north. Based on these values Turkish Cypriot owners of properties in the south were assigned points in exchange for submitting their title-deeds to the Turkish Cypriot government. After this, an owner could exchange his/her points for a Greek Cypriot property of equal point value located in the north. Points could also be traded, donated as a gift or inherited. The Turkish Cypriot government also issued ‘points’ as compensation to various categories of persons such as victims of the conflict or those who served in the Turkish Cypriot resistance struggle including the 1974 war. These points could then be exchanged for possession of Greek Cypriot property of equal ‘point’ value.
CONCLUSIONS

Displaced persons and their children and grandchildren today still constitute approximately one half of the citizen population in the island’s north and one third in the south. This means that their experiences of displacement and resettlement, the institutions put in place for their rehabilitation, as well as the social memory of those experiences and the places that they left behind that have been passed on to children, remain for many the most emotionally laden and sensitive issues to be addressed in any future settlement. However, as shown above, displacement in Cyprus has a history that predates the division of the island, and persons’ experiences of displacement vary based on the timing of their displacement, the places from which they were uprooted, their age at the time of displacement, and property left behind, among other factors.

Today the displaced persons in both parts of the island are resettled, but without a political solution of the wider Cyprus problem, claims related to lost homes and properties generally remain unresolved. In fact, the issue of such claims is one of the most challenging items on the agenda of the UN-sponsored inter-communal negotiations. A major reason for this is the two sides’ incompatible perceptions of how the island came to be divided in 1974 and their very different views of what constitutes a bizonal settlement in Cyprus. The Turkish Cypriot side holds that the present pattern of settlement of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot populations forms the basis of bizonality and that this should be taken into account in any arrangement to address the outstanding property claims. The Greek Cypriot side, on the other hand, regards the present division of the island as temporary and maintains that Greek Cypriots’ rights to their original homes and properties cannot be compromised in favour of any bizonal formula.

The Turkish Cypriot side’s approach to resettlement of displaced persons relied very much on the properties left empty after the departure of Greek Cypriots. Also, more generally, these properties were utilized to build a new social and economic environment in what was regarded as the Turkish Cypriot zone. As such, they were allocated – initially only for use but later also for possession – to various categories of ‘entitled’ individuals encompassing a large part of the Turkish Cypriot community. Within the framework of the Turkish Cypriot regime, most Greek Cypriot property is now under new ownership (private or public) and can be inherited, mortgaged, traded, sold including to foreigners, and developed for private or public use.
In the south, various government mechanisms were put in place in order to address the needs of displaced persons and the substantially worsened socioeconomic conditions in the wake of the 1974 division. These included incentives to displaced business people, employment creating state-led development projects, provision of low-cost government housing estates, provision of aid on the basis of various housing schemes, and a loans and guarantees system for dispossessed owners. In 1991, abandoned Turkish Cypriot properties were placed under the ‘custodianship’ of the interior minister and transfer of title of such property was generally ruled out. Most of these properties are currently leased to Greek Cypriot displaced persons (at a rate lower than the market rate) or to the government, local authorities and organisations working for public benefit (at market rate). Some Turkish Cypriot property has been modified through building refugee housing estates and various forms of infrastructure.

The findings of focus group discussions with displaced persons held on both sides of the island presented in the last section of this report provide insight into the impact of the easing of movement restrictions in 2003 on ideas about reunification and return, as well as into views concerning favoured remedies for settlement of property claims, prospects of a solution and the negotiations process.

Many Greek Cypriot participants said that visiting the north made them realize that return was now not very likely or as desirable as previously felt. A commonly mentioned reason was the fact that with other people having established their lives there, all was now changed. Another reason was how complicated return would be for them given that their lives have been set up for so long in a different place and community. For almost all Greek Cypriot participants, an important condition required for return was that they would need to be under Greek Cypriot administration since they would not feel safe otherwise. The Turkish Cypriot participants, for their part, mostly spoke about how their visit to the south confirmed their long-held view that return was unrealistic however desirable it may be for some. A few would consider it only if their village community as a whole was returning. Turkish Cypriot participants were generally pessimistic about the viability of bringing the two Cypriot communities together again, mainly for safety reasons. However, participants from both sides related positive experiences and sympathetic impressions of their encounters with current occupants of their pre-1974 homes, or with pre-1974 owners of their present homes, as the case may be.

Most Greek Cypriot participants expressed frustration with the way the peace negotiations were still carrying on after all these years without much prospect of a successful conclusion. They also found it objectionable that the negotiations were being conducted by the political leadership without any genuine consultation with the people whose rights and interests were involved. The Turkish Cypriot participants were similarly concerned about the lack of transparency in the negotiations. They also raised many questions about the various complications that may arise in the implementation of any agreement on property given all that has happened within the framework of the property regime that has developed in the north since 1974.
Conclusions

Despite the reservations many of them felt about returning to the Turkish-administered north, for the Greek Cypriot participants restitution was the preferred remedy for property claims, followed by compensation, especially if the property was to remain under Turkish Cypriot administration. Exchange appeared to be the least favoured option as it was regarded as too complex to implement, and therefore something unlikely to be realised in practice. Most Turkish Cypriot participants, in contrast, support a primarily exchange and compensation-based solution. This is despite the fact that quite a few of them had serious misgivings about the ‘equivalent property exchange’ already completed in the north between individual owners who left property in the south and the Turkish Cypriot authorities.

One crucial point that is revealed in this overview of conflict-related displacement in Cyprus and its implications is this: the more time that is allowed to pass without a political solution in Cyprus, the more difficult it becomes to alter the existing situation without seriously upsetting the lives of many people. What may originally have been seen as temporary measures to resettle displaced persons have, over time, become entrenched in the institutions of both sides of the island, while the passage of time has also produced generational differences in attitudes toward return and impediments to the reestablishment of communities. In addition, the recent resort to legal forums to resolve claims relating to lost property has shown both the willingness of some displaced persons to solve their own problems outside the framework of a comprehensive settlement, and also the potential legal and political complications that will inevitably multiply with the passage of time. Any resolution of the issues of property and displacement, then, must take into account these actual circumstances that influence and even shape the lives of several hundred thousand Cypriots.
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Over the course of two decades, more than 220,000 Cypriots lost their homes and properties, initially as a result of inter-communal violence in the 1950s and 1960s and later because of the war and subsequent division of the island in 1974. Property issues arising from these past internal displacements have become intertwined with the competing political and geostrategic aims of the two Cypriot communities, and have thus remained unresolved to this day. Moreover, with the passage of time these issues have turned into legally and technically the most complicated part of the Cyprus dispute; they are also central to economic and social considerations in the event of a peace agreement.

Significantly, the issue of displaced persons’ rights also has a complex emotional aspect. This is because it has had, and continues to have, a direct impact on the lives of individuals and local communities, more than any other aspect of the Cyprus problem. Most Cypriots link the issue of displaced persons’ rights with the wrongs done to them by the other community; the loss of homes, property and livelihoods; ancestral lands; original habitats and cultural artefacts; and the social life that surrounded them. Thus, there are highly emotive, normative and personal sentiments surrounding the issue. These sentiments will not fade away quickly and probably will continue to frame collective imaginations even after a formal solution of the issue is attained, complicating the implementation of such a solution.

This report presents an overview of the various phases of population displacements in Cyprus, as well as a synopsis of the political, legal, social and psychological consequences of conflict-related displacement.

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